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ABSTRACT 
A tremendous amount of individual-level data is generated each day, with a wide variety of uses. 
This data often contains sensitive information about individuals, which can be disclosed by 
“adversaries”. Even when direct identifiers such as social security numbers are masked, an 
adversary may be able to recognize an individual's identity for a data record by looking at the 
values of quasi-identifiers (QID), known as identity disclosure, or can uncover sensitive attributes 
(SA) about an individual through attribute disclosure. In data privacy field, multiple disclosure 
risk measures have been proposed. These share two drawbacks: they do not consider identity and 
attribute disclosure concurrently, and they make restrictive assumptions on an adversary's 
knowledge and disclosure target by assuming certain attributes are QIDs and SAs with clear 
boundary in between. In this study, we present a Flexible Adversary Disclosure Risk (FADR) 
measure that addresses these limitations, by presenting a single combined metric of identity and 
attribute disclosure, and considering all scenarios for an adversary’s knowledge and disclosure 
targets while providing the flexibility to model a specific disclosure preference. 
In addition, we employ FADR measure to develop our novel “RU Generalization” algorithm that 
anonymizes a sensitive dataset to be able to publish the data for public access while preserving the 
privacy of individuals in the dataset. The challenge is to preserve privacy without incurring 
excessive information loss. Our RU Generalization algorithm is a greedy heuristic algorithm, 
which aims at minimizing the combination of both disclosure risk and information loss, to obtain 
an optimized anonymized dataset.     
We have conducted a set of experiments on a benchmark dataset from 1994 Census database, to 
evaluate both our FADR measure and RU Generalization algorithm. We have shown the 
robustness of our FADR measure and the effectiveness of our RU Generalization algorithm by 
comparing with the benchmark anonymization algorithm.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
A tremendous amount of data about people is generated every day, by business, healthcare, and 
government computer systems and by Internet of Things (IoT) devices such as cell phones and 
activity monitoring wristwatches.  This information is useful to marketing, decision makers, and 
researchers, in particular individual level data (aka microdata) which can be used for detailed 
modeling and machine learning.  However, microdata usually contains private and sensitive 
information about individuals and thus is considered confidential.  Consequently, these datasets 
cannot be made freely available for public access.  
For instance, Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are a significant source for medical research 
purposes.  Because of private data on identity, demographics, and health conditions, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [1] restricts access to EHR and preserves 
the privacy of patients in the system. Similarly, FERPA and other federal and state legislation 
governs privacy of sensitive datasets containing individual level data such as those from student’s 
school enrollment, performance, and disciplinary information, Department of Correction (DOC) 
records, and Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) records.   Yet this data has significant potential in 
helping identify problems and improve performance of services in these areas.  
This raises the question of how data owners can share their data for research purposes while not 
violating individuals’ privacy.   This problem has been recently studied in depth, in two relatively 
close areas; Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) and Privacy Preserving Data Publishing 
(PPDP). They are both sharing the same concepts in the field of data privacy, with a little 
difference in their methodologies.  
In SDC, confidential microdata is modified such that third parties working with these data are 
prevented to recognize individuals in the dataset. SDC techniques include sampling, adding noise, 
rounding, data swapping, etc.  
In PPDP area, various privacy models are proposed, each specifies a privacy requirement. A 
privacy requirement assures that the privacy of individuals in a confidential dataset is preserved 
up to a certain level. Thus, by applying privacy techniques on a confidential microdata, it satisfies 
a privacy requirement and then it is ready to be published for public access.    
SDC and PPDP both aim at creating privacy preserved version of a confidential dataset. The output 
protected dataset needs to be evaluated with respect to two criteria; privacy and data utility. 
Evaluating the privacy of a protected dataset is done by measuring disclosure risk. Disclosure risk 
is a measure indicating how much the output dataset is protected in terms of individual’s privacy 
and how much the individuals are at risk of having their confidential information disclosed. Data 
utility is a measure showing how much original information is lost in the output dataset due to the 
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changes made on the original dataset. The goal is to have an approach that minimizes the disclosure 
risk while maximizing the data utility.  
Microdata typically includes three types of attributes of concern from a privacy perspective: Direct 
Identifiers, Quasi-Identifiers (QID), and Sensitive Attributes (SA).   
Direct identifiers are the attributes which are unique per person and a record can be easily matched 
to an individual by seeing a direct identifier in that record, such as social security number, phone 
number, or email address.  For privacy preservation, these attributes need to be removed from the 
data. They are often replaced by randomly assigned identifiers in order to be able to relate multiple 
records of individual data. 
This by itself does not guarantee de-identification of the data because there might be other data 
fields, named quasi-identifiers (QID), such as birthdate, gender, and zip code, any one of which 
are not unique to a person, but when they are considered together, with high probability, the 
combination of QID field values can be used to identify individuals. This identification may occur 
when an "adversary" determines a person’s quasi-identifiers values from publicly available data 
(local census data, voter lists, tax assessors, or real estate agencies, Facebook …) or personal 
knowledge, and uses this information to match against quasi-identifiers appearing in the 
confidential dataset. For example Sweeney [2] demonstrated discovering the medical record of the 
governor of Massachusetts from data released by the Group Insurance Commission, after obtaining 
the governor’s QID-values from public sources.  87% of U.S. citizens can be uniquely recognized 
in datasets using only their birth date, gender, and 5-digit zip code [2]. 
Sensitive attributes (SA) contain private and confidential information about an individual.  
Sensitive attributes are those that PPDP is mainly concerned about protecting from association 
with specific individuals.      
In order to preserve the privacy of people in a dataset, it is required to know what the threats to 
their privacy are. Three main privacy threats have been introduced: Identity Disclosure Threat, 
Attribute Disclosure Threat, and Membership Disclosure Threat. These threats come from an 
adversary who wants to disclose private information of a person, referred to as a victim.  
Identity Disclosure occurs when an adversary can recognize that a record in the released dataset 
belongs to an individual.  In this case, the adversary knows the QID values of a victim and can 
match those with the QIDs of the published confidential dataset and find a matching record 
belonging to that person.  
Attribute Disclosure occurs when an adversary can link a sensitive value to an individual.  Here 
the adversary may not precisely identify a record of a specific victim but could infer his/her 
sensitive values from the published data, based on the set of sensitive values associated with the 
group that the victim belongs to.   
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Membership Disclosure occurs when an adversary can determine the existence of an individual in 
the published dataset when the membership of the person in that dataset itself counts as private 
information. This means the presence or the absence of the person’s record in the released dataset 
already reveals private information.   
In PPDP area, different privacy models are proposed for thwarting these threats and we will review 
them in depth in Chapter 2.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Most disclosure risk measures proposed in the literature address only identity disclosure attack. 
These risk measures are defined based on either uniqueness or re-identification. In uniqueness 
measures, risk is defined as the probability that the rare combination of QID values in the privacy-
preserved dataset is indeed rare in the population dataset [3]. Re-identification methods estimate 
the number of re-identifications an adversary can obtain by matching QIDs from external 
knowledge against confidential dataset through record linkage algorithms [4-8]. Re-identification 
methods require the assumption of knowing the exact external knowledge for an adversary. 
Domingo-Ferrer addressed this issue by proposing the “maximum knowledge attacker model”, 
which considers an adversary who knows the values of all QIDs in the confidential dataset about 
a victim [9].  
Although identity disclosure risk measures have been studied in depth, very few works proposed 
approaches to measure attribute disclosure attacks. Some studies proposed classification accuracy 
as a measure of attribute disclosure after using classifiers to predict the categorical sensitive 
attribute values [10, 11]. Various privacy models for attribute disclosure have been proposed. 
However, instead of measuring the risk of attribute disclosure, they specify a Boolean condition 
in which the dataset is prevented from attribute disclosure if it satisfies the condition [12]. For 
instance, Machanavajjhala et al. proposed a privacy model named “ℓ-Diversity”, which requires 
the records with similar values in their QIDs have diverse sensitive values [13]. As another privacy 
model, “t-closeness” requires the distribution of sensitive values in each group of records with 
similar QID values to be close to the overall distribution [14].    
A drawback of existing identity disclosure risk measures and attribute disclosure privacy models 
is that they classify specific attributes as QIDs and SAs, with a clear boundary in between. This 
limits an adversary’s external knowledge to specific QIDs and the disclosure target to specific 
SAs. In reality, many adversaries exist with different external knowledge and disclosure targets. 
A sensitive attribute for an adversary can be a disclosure target, whereas another adversary might 
know that attribute about a victim and use that as a QID. Some work has been done to find QIDs 
by defining measures such as distinct ratio and separation ratio [15]. These measures are defined 
based on value frequencies in different combinations of attribute such that the combinations that 
lead to more unique values are more likely to form QIDs. 
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Since a privacy preserved microdata is evaluated in terms of disclosure risk and data utility, the 
optimum privacy technique is the one that results in a dataset with minimum disclosure risk and 
maximum data utility. However, there is always a trade-off between preserving privacy and data 
utility. Because, the more changes we make on the confidential dataset to reduce disclosure risk, 
the more information the data loses and the less data utility it preserves. Thus, developing an 
optimum privacy technique seems to be infeasible. Nevertheless, it has been the subject of recent 
studies to improve privacy techniques to achieve higher data utility while not losing privacy.  
In recent studies, researchers have been interested in handling multiple sensitive attributes because 
initially proposed privacy models just consider single SA. Extending an initial privacy model to 
address multiple SAs needs a modification in its definition that preserves each SA separately. 
Using former algorithms to employ redefined model incurs huge information loss because the 
privacy requirement has become stricter. Thus, new privacy techniques need to be proposed to 
preserve all sensitive attributes and protect data utility at the same time. The algorithms for these 
techniques also need to be efficient to work with a large number of SAs.  
One problem with recent studies addressing multiple SAs is that proposed algorithms are evaluated 
based on only a few sensitive attributes (less than 10). For instance, Wang and Zhu presented a 
novel algorithm that can thwart different attacks to SAs but it is just limited to two SAs and 
extension of their work is left for future work [16].  
Another challenge with multiple SAs that is not well addressed in the literature is that sensitive 
attributes may have different characteristics and there is no comprehensive privacy model that can 
consider all these features. For example, “ℓ-Diversity” is a well-known privacy model for 
preserving categorical SA but it doesn’t work with highly skewed SAs or numerical SAs [13]. On 
the other hand some models like “(𝑘, 𝑒)- anonymity” [17] or “(𝜀, 𝑚) - anonymity” [18] are 
proposed just to handle numerical sensitive attributes. Also to handle highly skewed SAs, “t-
closeness” is presented [19]. In case of handling multiple sensitive attributes, Liu et al. proposed 
a method to handle multiple numeric sensitive attributes [20]. SLOMS is another approach for 
handling multiple SAs that is based on  ℓ -Diversity privacy model and thereby not so appropriate 
for numeric SAs [21]. 
In addition, when the dataset contains many sensitive attributes, they may be in different levels of 
sensitivity, meaning that some SA may contain more sensitive information than others. For 
instance, consider “Disease” and “Occupation” as sensitive attributes of people in a dataset. 
“Disease” is considered more sensitive than “Occupation” and people are stricter in keeping their 
disease information personal and private compared to their occupation information.  
Even within one sensitive attribute, some values can be more sensitive than others especially for 
binary attributes. For example, consider a sensitive attribute Dropout Flag which shows whether 
a student has dropped out of school (Y) or not (N). Having Dropout Flag as ‘Y’ is more sensitive 
than ‘N’ and in terms of preserving the privacy; it is more important to hide the identification of 
students who have dropped out of school.  
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Having different sensitivity level, either between SAs or between values within one SA, is not 
addressed among recent studies dealing with multiple SAs. If we consider these characteristics for 
our sensitive attributes, we may be able to relax some privacy requirements and therefore better 
preserves data utility.  
1.3 Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: 
1. Develop Flexible Adversary Disclosure Risk (FADR) measure, as a novel disclosure risk 
measure which: 
a. Captures both identity and attribute disclosure attack 
b. Models all possible kinds of knowledge for adversary  
c. Considers different sensitivity levels of sensitive attributes 
d. Considers different sensitivity levels of values within one sensitive attribute 
2. Develop a pruning algorithm to handle calculation efficiency of FADR measure when 
considering all possible kinds of knowledge for adversary and having many sensitive 
attributes 
3. Develop an optimization algorithm to minimize both disclosure risk and information loss 
through generalization 
4. Develop an algorithm to calculate FADR measure on a generalized dataset assuming the 
maximum knowledge adversary  
a. Compare the FADR and information loss measures on the generalized dataset 
obtained from our optimization algorithm and benchmark algorithms 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Privacy Models 
In the literature, privacy models have been classified in three basic categories with respect to the 
three privacy threats: models against identity-disclosure, attribute-disclosure, and membership-
disclosure.  A privacy model formulates privacy requirements and objectives that are accomplished 
by the algorithms that are also focusing on data utility objectives.  
In this chapter, we introduce both fundamental and recent models within each category 
accompanied by the algorithms.  
2.1.1 Privacy Models against Identity Disclosure 
These models try to thwart identity disclosure attacks through record linkage between the 
published dataset and an available external dataset.   
 
 
Figure 1. Example of k-anonymity, where QIDs are (Race, Birth, Gender, and ZIP) and k=2 [2] 
An older but fundamental model is called k-anonymity [2]. K-anonymity can be counted as a 
baseline for later models.  It prevents record linkage as any individual can be matched with at least 
k records in the published dataset based on their quasi-identifiers.  This is achieved by transforming 
quasi-identifiers and creating groups of at least k records with equal quasi-identifiers called 
equivalence classes.  It limits the probability of identifying an individual in the published dataset 
down to 1/K. For instance, Figure 1 illustrates a 2-anonymity data table with race, birth year, 
gender, and zip code as QIDs and it contains 5 equivalence classes in which QID values are the 
same. Here, zip code is the only QID that is generalized by hiding its last digit. According to this 
anonymized data table, if an adversary wants to disclose the information of a victim who is a black 
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female, born in 1964, and lives in 02137 zip code, he can find 2 records having this characteristics 
and therefore cannot find the exact record belonging to that victim.     
Since k-anonymity is originally defined for single-table datasets, one of its extensions is multi-
relational k-anonymity which supports anonymization in multi-relational database schema [22]. 
However, it has been shown that using single-table k-anonymity algorithms for multiple relation 
setting either fails in protecting identity disclosure, or excessively reduces data utility of the 
anonymized dataset.  For this model, the definition of quasi-identifier and k-anonymity are 
modified, and specific data utility measures are proposed to fit multi-relational setting.          
Transactional data or so-called “set-valued” data are treated differently in terms of preserving 
privacy.  Purchased items for a customer or diagnosis codes for a patient are examples of this kind 
of data.  The privacy threat for these data occurs when an adversary has some knowledge about an 
individual’s subset of transactional data.  Terrovitis et al. have proposed 𝐾𝑚 anonymity model as 
an extension of basic k-anonymity model that avoids the association of a specific transaction to a 
particular person [23]. Since the knowledge of the adversary is not known by the data publisher, 
𝐾𝑚 anonymity model assumes that the maximum knowledge of an adversary is at most m items 
of a transaction and therefore it enforces the anonymization by requiring each set of m or less items 
to appear in at least k records of the released dataset. 
He and Naughton addressed the limitations of 𝐾𝑚 anonymity [24]. They stated that the choice of 
safe m for  𝐾𝑚 anonymity is sometimes impossible. Because it may happen that based on the 
background knowledge of an adversary about a victim, extra items other than those m items in a 
transaction cannot be matched with the victim; therefore, less than k records will be remained for 
being linked to the victim and that increases the risk of identity disclosure.  Thus, in response to 
these drawbacks, He and Naughton used basic k-anonymity model instead, i.e., for any transaction 
there should be at least k−1 other identical transactions in the released dataset.  
2.1.2 Privacy Models against Attribute Disclosure 
These models prevent sensitive attribute disclosure for an individual.  As described in Chapter 1, 
thwarting identity disclosure does not guarantee preventing attribute disclosure.  Sometimes you 
may find multiple records matching an individual (like a k-anonymity dataset), therefore, you can 
claim that the identity disclosure for that person is prevented.  However, it is possible that among 
those multiple matching records (equivalence class), sensitive attributes have unique values.  In 
this case, regardless of knowing which record in the equivalence class belongs to that individual, 
the sensitive value is revealed and this is where attribute disclosure occurs. For instance, back in 
Figure 1, assume that Problem is the sensitive attribute. If a victim is a black female, born in 1965, 
and lives in the 02138 zip code, then although the adversary is finding 2 matched records for this 
victim, he will find that the victim has hypertension problem and therefore the private information 
of the victim is revealed. This is called homogeneity attack on k-anonymity, which leads to 
sensitive attribute disclosure. There is also another attack on k-anonymity model, called 
background knowledge attack, which can disclose the sensitive attribute of an individual by 
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excluding from the equivalence class those sensitive attributes that are not probable to be 
associated with that individual based on the background knowledge of the adversary.  
Machanavajjhala et al. described these two attacks and proposed a new model, named “ℓ-
Diversity”, against attribute disclosure in order to thwart the aforementioned attacks and address 
the shortcomings of k-anonymity [13]. ℓ-Diversity requires each equivalence class to contain at 
least ℓ ‘‘well represented’’ sensitive attribute (SA) values.  The simplest interpretation of ‘‘well 
represented’’ is distinct, and leads to “Distinct ℓ-Diversity”, which enforces the equivalence class 
to have at least ℓ distinct SA values.  Some variations of ℓ-Diversity with respect to the 
interpretation of “well represented” are as follows: 
Entropy ℓ -Diversity, in which for every equivalence class E; 
 − ∑ 𝑝(𝐸, 𝑠) log(𝑝(𝐸, 𝑠))
𝑠∈𝑆
≥ log(ℓ) (1) 
where 𝑝(𝐸, 𝑠) is the fraction of records in E that have the sensitive value s and S is SA domain. 
This criteria actually enforces that each equivalence class not only must have enough different 
sensitive values, but also the different sensitive values must be distributed evenly enough.  
 Recursive (c,ℓ)-Diversity, which requires each class to contain a large number of distinct 
SA values, none of which appears too often or too rare. 
 Positive Disclosure-Recursive (c, ℓ)-Diversity and Negative/Positive Disclosure-
Recursive (c, ℓ)-Diversity, which capture background knowledge of an adversary and 
consider the cases in which some values of SA do not require protection since they are 
too frequent or they may not pose a threat to privacy.     
There are other similar models to ℓ-Diversity, such as the “p-sensitive k-anonymity” model [25] 
in which parameter p acts like ℓ in Distinct ℓ -Diversity, and the “(α,k)-anonymity” model [26] in 
which the frequency (fraction) of a sensitive value in each equivalence class is no more than α. 
Both of these models enforce k-anonymity at the beginning to create equivalence classes and then 
protect SA in those classes.  Although these models seem similar, they differ in their applied 
algorithms and we will introduce these algorithms in the “Privacy Techniques” section of this 
chapter. 
A year after ℓ-Diversity was introduced, Ninghui et al. addressed two attacks on ℓ-Diversity: 
skewness attack and similarity attack, both of which can cause disclosure of the sensitive value(s) 
for an individual [19]. They proved that if the overall distribution of the sensitive attribute values 
is highly skewed (skewness attack) and also known to the adversary, or if the sensitive values 
within each equivalence class are distinct but semantically close to each other (similarity attack), 
then ℓ-Diversity cannot protect sensitive attributes.  They generalized the background knowledge 
attack by replacing the prior belief of the adversary about an individual’s SA with the global 
background knowledge that is the distribution of SA in the whole population.  Therefore, they 
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proposed a new privacy model called “t-closeness” in which the distance between the distribution 
of a sensitive attribute in each equivalence class and the distribution of the attribute in the whole 
table is no more than a threshold t.  They used Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [27] to compute 
the distance between distributions.  
Recently, Soria-Comas et al. proposed a new study on t-closeness model in which they used a 
different privacy technique for creating equivalence classes than the one in the original model [14]. 
In fact, they used a micro-aggregation technique instead of generalization in order to create k-
anonymous data and apply the t-closeness model, and they proved that changing generalization to 
micro-aggregation improves the data utility.  We will explain these techniques in the “Privacy 
Techniques” section.   
Later, Ninghui et al. extended their proposed model to a more flexible model called “(n,t)-
closeness” in order to achieve a better balance between privacy and utility [28]. In this model, 
instead of considering the sensitive values in the whole population, it limits the amount of sensitive 
information about the individuals by looking through a group with minimum size of ‘n’.  In fact, 
it enforces the distribution of any equivalence class to be close to the distribution of at least one 
superset of that equivalence class containing at least n records, with respect to the sensitive 
attribute.  The other novelty of this work is that they addressed the limitation of EMD for 
computing the distance between distributions and therefore proposed a novel distance measure 
based on kernel smoothing that satisfies all of the required properties. 
Thwarting similarity attacks is the subject of recent studies.  This attack may be applied against 
either categorical or numerical sensitive attributes.  Following we discuss this issue in more depth, 
along with the recent related works for both categorical and numeric sensitive attributes. 
Similarity Attack on Numeric Sensitive Attribute 
When the sensitive attribute is numeric, having diverse sensitive values is not sufficient for 
preventing attribute disclosure attack.  Although the sensitive values are distinct, they all may fall 
into a short interval.  For example, if a sensitive attribute is ‘salary’, by looking at the anonymized 
released table the adversary may find that an individual's salary (say, "Mary"), can possibly be 
$10k, $11k, $13k, or $15k.  Although the adversary will not know the exact value of Mary’s salary, 
they will find that it is within the range of $10k and $15k, which is a short enough interval to 
determine that Mary has a low income and thereby threatens her privacy.  In the literature, this 
issue is referred to as a similarity attack on a numeric sensitive attribute, a proximity breach, or a 
range disclosure.   
One of the foundational models dealing with proximity breach was proposed by Zhang et al. called 
“(k,e)- Anonymity” [17]. This model restricts each equivalence class to have at least k different 
sensitive values with a range of at least e.  One drawback of the (k,e)-Anonymity model is that it 
doesn’t consider the distribution of sensitive values within a range in an equivalence class.  Thus, 
regardless of having a wide range of values, if some sensitive values occur frequently within that 
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range, the adversary can still find that an individual is more likely to be linked to the more frequent 
values within that range.     
The following year, another model, “(𝜀, 𝑚)-anonymity” was proposed to address the 
aforementioned limitation of the (k,e)- Anonymity model [29]. (𝜀, 𝑚)-anonymity holds that, given 
an equivalence class E, for every sensitive value x in E at most 1/m of its tuples can have sensitive 
values similar to x. Being similar to x is quantified by parameter 𝜀. For instance, two values are 
similar if their absolute difference is at most 𝜀. Later, Li et al. proposed a more effective algorithm 
to achieve (𝜀, 𝑚)-anonymity than the one originally proposed in terms of gaining better data utility 
and less computation time [18].   
Loukides et al. addressed some new issues on range disclosure attack which had not been solved 
in prior work [30]. Although the proposed approach considered numeric sensitive attribute, it can 
also be applied to the categorical sensitive attribute as well. Their method also introduced a privacy 
measure, called Range Diversity that allows anonymizers to specify detailed protection 
requirements for sensitive ranges, and quantifies the amount of protection for ranges by taking 
both positive and negative disclosure into account.  This approach measured the probability of 
disclosing any range in the least protected equivalence class of a table, and captures the way 
sensitive attribute values form ranges in a class, based on their frequency and similarity.  Through 
their experiments, the authors also showed that their approach achieved significantly lower data 
utility loss than the (𝜀, 𝑚)-anonymity approach by measuring data utility for the same runs of the 
algorithms using two different criteria for data utility metrics: Worst Group Utility (WGU) [31] 
and Average Utility (AU) [32]. 
An issue that is not covered in the above studies is the problem of having multiple numeric 
sensitive attributes and trying to protect the set from similarity attack.  Liu et al. proposed a method 
to address this issue [33].  Their method uses the appropriate privacy techniques such as clustering 
and multi-sensitive bucketization (MSB).  However, this paper does not present an algorithm to 
achieve this method.  
Similarity Attack on Categorical Sensitive Attribute 
Similarity attack on categorical sensitive attribute is also known as semantic attack.  This is the 
case when sensitive values in an equivalence class are distinct but semantically similar.  For 
instance, an equivalence class has ‘gastric ulcer’, ‘gastritis’, and ‘stomach cancer’ as distinct 
sensitive values for ‘disease’ sensitive attribute.  Although these are distinct, they are semantically 
related and if an individual is linked to this class, an adversary will know that he has stomach-
related disease.    
The prior studies on thwarting similarity attack, focused on numeric sensitive attributes and their 
proposed models do not work for categorical sensitive attribute. However, Wang et al. proposed 
“(k, ε)- Anonymity” model based on the semantic similarity to thwarting similarity attack [34]. 
This model requires that each equivalence class in anonymous dataset satisfy k-anonymity 
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constraints and at the same time, any two sensitive values in the same equivalence class are not ε 
-similar.  The definition of the ε –similar is based on the semantic hierarchical tree of a sensitive 
attribute.  According to this approach, semantic similarity between two values can be measured by 
the path length between the two values on this tree. 
 
 
Figure 2. The semantic hierarchical tree for a disease attribute [34] 
For example, Figure 2 is a semantic hierarchical tree of the disease attribute.  As shown in this 
tree, ‘gastric ulcer’ and ‘gastritis’ have a common parent on the tree, so they are semantically 
similar.  
However, ‘flu’ and ‘gastritis’ have only a common great grandparent, so they are comparatively 
dissimilar.  Semantic distance is defined such that two sensitive values 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are ε-similar if: 
 (ℎ1 − ℎ𝑐) + (ℎ2 − ℎ𝑐)
2
 ≥  𝜀 
(2) 
where ℎ1 and ℎ2 are the level of 𝑠1  and 𝑠2  in the semantic hierarchical tree and ℎ𝑐 is the level of 
their closest common ancestor.  In Figure 2, ‘gastric ulcer’ and ‘gastritis’ are 1-similar and ‘flu’ 
and ‘gastritis’ are 3-similar.    
2.1.3 Privacy Models against Membership Disclosure 
Knowing the existence of an individual in a dataset can pose a privacy risk.  Therefore, here we 
will present the models in the literature that attempt to thwart attacks aimed at identifying the 
existence of an individual in an anonymized dataset.  
Nergiz et al. proposed the first model called “-presence” [35]. -presence is a metric to evaluate 
the risk of identifying an individual in a table based on generalization of publicly known data.  This 
model assures that the membership disclosure is protected when the probability of inferring that 
an individual’s record is contained in a sensitive database is within a range (min, max) of 
acceptable probabilities.  The parameters min and max are specified by data publisher who also 
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need to possess the population table P. P is assumed to contain ‘‘all publicly known data’’ (i.e., 
the direct identifiers and quasi-identifiers of all individuals in the population, including those in 
D). 
-presence has a drawback that requires data owners to have access to complete information about 
the population, in the form of table P.  Thus, the authors tried to overcome this limitation and 
improve their method by presenting a modified version of -presence, which is “c-Confident -
presence” [36]. “c-Confident -presence” assumes a set of distribution functions for the population 
(i.e., attackers know the probability that an individual is associated with one or more values, over 
one or more attributes) instead of table P, and ensures that a record is -present with respect to the 
population with an owner-specified probability c. 
2.2 Privacy Techniques 
A common theme among privacy models is creating equivalence classes.  This initially came from 
the “k-anonymity” model that forces creation of equivalence classes by generalizing quasi-
identifiers in a way that all records in one equivalence class have the same values of quasi-
identifiers. Later on, this became a privacy technique used for employing most of the privacy 
models either for identity-disclosure prevention or for attribute-disclosure prevention.  The 
prevention of identity disclosure requires transforming quasi-identifiers in order to create 
equivalence classes in a way that it achieves privacy model requirement and data utility objectives 
as well.  The later ensures that preserving the data privacy will not make data lose excessive 
information.  Since transforming the data to achieve privacy and optimal utility is computationally 
infeasible, most algorithms adopt heuristic strategies to explore the space of possible solutions, i.e. 
they consider different ways of transforming quasi-identifiers in order to find a ‘‘good’’ solution 
that satisfies privacy and the utility objective.  Therefore, the algorithms to employ privacy models 
usually consist of data transformation, data utility measure, and heuristic strategies to search for 
the “good” solution.  
In the following section, we introduce transformation methods, utility objectives, and heuristic 
strategies addressed in the literature, and then go through the algorithms using these techniques.    
2.2.1 Anonymization Operations 
Transforming Quasi-Identifiers 
There are three main anonymization operations for transforming QIDs of the similar records to be 
in an equivalence class: Generalization, Suppression, and Micro-aggregation.  
Fung et al. presented different forms of generalization and suppression methods as anonymization 
operations in their recent survey [37]. 
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Figure 3. Generalization Hierarchy for Job, Sex, and Age [37]. 
The most common method found in the literature is generalization.  Generalization replaces quasi-
identifier’s value by more general, but semantically consistent, values. Each QID has a 
generalization hierarchy tree, called taxonomy tree, which shows the values of the attribute as the 
leaves of the tree and the parent nodes are the generalized values. Figure 3, shows the taxonomy 
trees for QIDs Job, Sex, and Age.  
The two main models of generalization are “global recoding” and “local recoding”.  In global 
recoding, all values of a quasi-identifier will be generalized to a same level.  In contrast, local 
recoding generalizes those values differently; some instances may not be even generalized.  For 
example, for local recoding, in one partition, age can be generalized to 10 years interval while in 
the other partition it is generalized to 5 years interval. But for global recoding, all partitions have 
age interval of 10 years. Therefore, compared with global recoding, local recoding is more flexible, 
and therefore it produces a smaller information loss. However, this flexibility may cause data 
exploration problems.  For example, two instances may be treated differently in a data-mining task 
since they are generalized differently.            
Suppression also appears in different formats: Record suppression refers to suppressing an entire 
record; Value suppression refers to suppressing every instance of a given value in a table; and Cell 
suppression (or local suppression) refers to suppressing specific instances of a given value in a 
table.  
It is not only possible but also common for the algorithms to apply both generalization and 
suppression at the same time.  For example, Loukides et al. employ suppression when it is not 
possible to apply generalization while satisfying some utility requirements [38]. 
Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. also added a “Micro-aggregation” method to the above transformation 
techniques [39]. This involves replacing a group of values in a quasi-identifier, using a summary 
statistic (e.g., centroid or median for numerical and categorical QIDs, respectively).  This approach 
may harm data truthfulness, i.e., the centroid may not appear in the data.  
Permutation-Based 
Permutation-based approaches do not make any change to the values of the quasi-identifiers. In 
fact, they leave them intact to preserve more information and instead they break the association 
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between quasi-identifier attributes and sensitive attribute by permuting the sensitive attribute in 
order to prevent attribute disclosure. Therefore, you cannot certainly link any record to one 
sensitive value since that value is permuted and is not the original value for that person. 
One method used for this kind of operation is “Bucketization”.  In bucketization, the step of 
creating equivalence classes remains the same as generalization but within each class, called a 
bucket, instead of generalizing the quasi-identifier’s values, it separates the sensitive values from 
quasi-identifiers by randomly permuting the sensitive values within each bucket [40].       
Zhang et al. compared generalization to permutation on the same partitioning and found that since 
in permutation QID values are remained intact, aggregate query answering is more accurate on 
permuted data than generalized data [17].  
2.2.2 Data Utility Objectives 
Satisfying privacy constraints based on the privacy model is one side of PPDP algorithms.  The 
other side is retaining information so that the published data remains practically useful.  There 
are three broad categories of information metrics for measuring data usefulness: General Purpose 
Metrics, Specific Purpose Metrics, and Trade-off Metrics.     
General Purpose Metrics 
In many cases, the data publisher does not know how the published data will be used and analyzed 
by the recipient.  Therefore, they generally compare the anonymous data with the original data and 
quantify information loss incurred by data transformation in terms of an optimization measure, 
which they attempt to minimize.  Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. classified these metrics into the 
following two groups [39]:  
1. Metrics that look at the size of equivalence class: 
Since the records within an equivalence class share the same values over quasi-identifier, 
they become indistinguishable from one another and therefore if each equivalence class 
contains many records, that means we have high information loss. Examples of these 
metrics include: 
 Discernibility Metric (DM): charging a penalty to each record for being 
indistinguishable from other records with respect to QID. 
 
𝐶𝐷𝑀 =  ∑ |𝐸|
2
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐸
 
  
 Normalized Average Equivalence Class Size: 
𝐶𝐴𝑉𝐺 = (
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
) /(𝑘) 
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The drawback of this group of metrics is that they ignore the way values are transformed within 
each class while more generalized values lose more information compared with less generalized 
values.  This motivates next group of metrics. 
2. Metrics that penalize more generalized values include [39]  
 
 Minimal Distortion (MD): each level of generalization is assigned 1 unit of distortion 
for each value. For example, for attribute Job, looking at Figure 3, if 10 records with 
Engineer value generalized to Professional, 10 units of distortion occurs (1 unit for 
each record). While, if these records are generalized to Any, 20 units of distortion 
occurs (2 units for each record) because of having 2 levels of generalization.             
 Normalized Certainty Penalty (NCP): charging a penalty of |𝑣𝑔 |/|𝐴| to each 
generalized instance value (𝑣𝑔) of attribute A. |𝑣𝑔| is the number of leaf nodes in the 
generalization hierarchy of A that are descendants of 𝑣𝑔. |𝐴| is the total number of 
domain values of the attribute A. For example, for one instance of the generalized 
value Artist in attribute Job, the penalty is 2/4 = 0.5. NCP for a record is derived as 
the summation of NCP of all attribute values of that record and finally NCP for a 
dataset is the summation of NCP of all records.     
Specific Purpose Metrics 
If we know the tasks the data will be used for, we can take those tasks into account during 
anonymization to better retain information.  Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. mentioned two instances of 
data usage tasks and their proposed information metric in the literature [39]:   
 Data Classification task: The proposed metric is Classification Metric (CM) which looks 
at the number of records whose class labels are different from that of the majority of 
records in their equivalence class, normalized by the dataset size. 
 Aggregate Query Answering tasks: The proposed metric is Average Relative Error 
(ARE) that measures the difference between the answers to a query using the anonymized 
dataset and the original dataset.  
Trade-off Metrics 
In the two aforementioned types of metrics, we look at data utility objective apart from satisfying 
privacy model.  This means that we choose an anonymized dataset that preserves the most 
information.  However, trade-off metrics consider both privacy and information requirements at 
the same time of every anonymization operation and determine an optimal trade-off between the 
two requirements.  For instance, a metric proposed in the literature is the ratio between information 
gain and the privacy loos [38]. It aims at maximizing information gain per each loos of privacy.  
The definition of information gain and privacy loos depends on the information metric and privacy 
model. 
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2.2.3 Heuristic Strategies 
The problem of creating a dataset satisfying a privacy model's requirement while optimally 
preserving the data utility objectives is NP-hard.  As mentioned before, optimally anonymizing 
data with respect to the aforementioned data utility criteria is computationally infeasible.  
Consequently, heuristic strategies are employed in the algorithms to find sets of equivalence 
classes heuristically.  In a survey studied by Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. a good classification of these 
strategies are presented in the following subsections [39]. 
Searching Strategies 
These strategies are applied when using generalization to transform quasi-identifiers and create 
equivalence classes.  They create a generalization hierarchy, called taxonomy, for each quasi-
identifier attribute separately and then combine those taxonomies for all quasi-identifier attributes, 
to obtain a lattice.  Thus, finding a way to generalize values can be performed by exploring the 
lattice using heuristics that avoid considering certain lattice nodes for efficiency reasons.  Here are 
examples of heuristic lattice search methods [39]: 
 Binary lattice search 
 Apriori-like lattice search 
 Genetic lattice search 
Binary lattice search prunes the ascendants of lattice nodes that are sufficient to satisfy a privacy 
model while Apriori-like and Genetic lattice search prune lattice nodes that are likely to incur high 
utility loss. 
Binary and Apriori-like lattice search strategies explore a small space of potential solutions and 
thus may fail to preserve data utility to the extent that genetic search strategies can do.  However, 
genetic search is computationally intensive.  Thus, more recent studies have focused on grouping 
strategies. 
Grouping Strategies 
As opposed to searching strategies, grouping strategies work on the records not the quasi-identifier 
values.  They split the records into groups iteratively in a way to find a “good” anonymized dataset 
heuristically with respect to the privacy and utility. Here are the examples of heuristic grouping 
strategies: 
 Data Partitioning:  Chooses a quasi-identifier to split the records into two groups based 
on the values on that attribute.  Each group will have similar values with respect to that 
quasi-identifier the splitting was based on.  This method iteratively does the splitting 
within each group in order to get a satisfactory dataset.   
 Data Clustering: In contrast to partitioning, clustering merges two groups of records 
based on the values of all quasi-identifier attributes together. 
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 Space Mapping: It ranks the records based on the values of quasi-identifiers.  In fact, 
records with similar values in quasi-identifiers have similar ranks.  It then records which 
consecutive ranks will form a group by satisfying privacy and utility requirements.   
Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. compared partitioning-based methods with clustering-based methods and 
concluded that partitioning-based methods incur higher utility loss and perform poorly when the 
dataset is skewed and also they are sensitive to the choice of the splitting attribute.  However, it is 
worth noting that partitioning is faster than clustering by orders of magnitude, requiring 
O(n.log(n)) time instead of O(n2), where n is the cardinality of the dataset.  The authors also 
pointed that space-mapping techniques achieve good efficiency, as the ranking can be calculated 
in linear time, as well as being effective at preserving data utility. 
2.2.4 Algorithms  
In this section, we introduce some algorithms for employing privacy models while preserving data 
utility.  These algorithms are demonstrated in  
 
Table 1, showing their satisfied privacy model, the anonymization operation used, the data utility 
metric, and also the applied heuristic strategy to come up with the optimal solution.   
Incognito was initially proposed by LeFevre et al. for efficiently employing k-anonymity model 
[41]. It searches through a lattice of all possible global recoding generalizations of quasi-identifiers 
and tries to find the one with the minimum distortion (MD), i.e., the one with least generalized 
values.  The enforced searching strategy is Apriori-like method that uses Breadth-First Search 
algorithm and aims at efficient searching by utilizing monotonicity property of k-anonymity that 
reduces the searching space.  Monotonicity property is saying that if a table is k-anonymous, then 
every generalization of that table is also k-anonymous.   
When the ℓ-Diversity model was proposed, the suggested algorithm to produce optimal ℓ-Diverse 
data was Incognito as well.  Machanavajjhala et al. stated that ℓ-Diversity also possesses the 
monotonicity property, i.e., if a table is ℓ-Diverse then every generalization of that table is also ℓ-
Diverse, and therefore they employed their model by using Incognito algorithm in the same way 
as it was used for k-anonymity except that in their work Incognito satisfied  ℓ-Diversity privacy 
constraints [13].  
Similarly, t-closeness was initially employed by Incognito. Li et al. could prove that if a table 
satisfies t-closeness, any further generalized version of that table also satisfies t-closeness.  Again 
this implies monotonicity property and motivates the implementation of Incognito algorithm [19].   
Mondrian multidimensional partitioning algorithm enforces the k-anonymity model by recursively 
greedy partitioning the space based on a selected quasi-identifier.  In each iteration of the 
algorithm, the data will be partitioned into two roughly even sized regions and the algorithm is 
recursively called for each of the two created regions and continues till no more partitions can be 
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created according to the k-anonymity constraint.  In this study, the data utility is measured by 
Discernibility Metric and also by the specific purpose metric which focuses on answering 
aggregated queries accurately [42]. 
 
Table 1. Algorithms for employing privacy models and preserving data utility 
Algorithm Privacy 
Model 
Anonymization 
Operation 
Data Utility Metric Heuristic 
Strategy 
Incognito K-anonymity 
& 
ℓ -Diversity & 
t-closeness 
Generalization & 
Suppression 
Minimal Distortion 
(MD) 
 
Apriori-
like lattice 
search 
Mondrian K-anonymity Generalization DM & Aggregate 
Query Answering 
Data 
Partitioning 
Mondrian t-closeness Generalization NCP Data 
Partitioning 
LSD Mondrian K-anonymity Generalization Regression Accuracy Data 
Partitioning 
Infogain 
Mondrian 
K-anonymity Generalization Classification 
Accuracy 
Data 
Partitioning 
KACA K-anonymity Generalization Minimal Distortion 
(MD) 
Data 
Clustering 
Hilbert & 
iDistance 
K-anonymity 
& 
ℓ -Diversity 
Generalization Normalized Certainty 
Penalty (NCP) 
Space 
Mapping 
t-Closeness-First 
Microaggregation 
t-closeness Microaggregation Sum of Squared Error 
(SSE) 
Data 
Clustering 
SPALM / 
MPALM 
-Presence Generalization Minimal Distortion 
(MD) 
Top-down 
lattice 
search 
SFALM c-Confident -
Presence 
Generalization Minimal Distortion 
(MD) 
Top-down 
lattice 
search 
Slicing K-anonymity 
& 
ℓ -Diversity 
Bucketization DM & Classification 
Accuracy 
Data 
Partitioning 
 
This Mondrian algorithm was extended to be adopted for different class of workload-aware 
anonymizations.  The initial algorithm was referred as “Median Mondrian” and then “Infogain 
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Mondrian” and “LSD Mondrian” were also proposed as the extensions, each for specific workload 
[43]. For single target classification model, Infogain Mondrian is introduced in which heuristic 
partitioning scheme will be based on information gain and at each recursive step, the algorithm 
chooses a split which not only satisfies the anonymity criteria but also minimizes the weighted 
entropy over the set of resulting partitions. At the end it will produce homogenous partitions of 
class labels. For single target regression model, LSD Mondrian is proposed which recursively 
chooses the split that minimizes the weighted sum of mean squared errors over the set of resulting 
partitions. 
Mondrian was also used in employing t-closeness model and its extension, (n,t)-closeness model 
[28]. It is also showed that (n,t)-closeness better preserves data utility than basic t-closeness model.  
KACA algorithm tries to find an arbitrary equivalence class of size smaller than k and merge it 
with the closest equivalence classes to form a larger equivalence class with the smallest distortion. 
This process repeats recursively until each equivalent class contains at least k tuples [44]. 
The use of space mapping techniques in algorithms Hilbert and iDistance enables them to preserve 
data utility equally well or even better than the Mondrian algorithm.  To map the space of quasi-
identifiers, Hilbert algorithm uses the Hilbert curve, which can preserve the locality of points (i.e., 
values in quasi-identifiers) fairly well.  The intuition behind using this curve is that, with high 
probability, two records with similar values in quasi-identifiers will also be similar with respect to 
their rank that is produced based on the curve.  The iDistance algorithm measures similarity based 
on sampling and clustering of points, and is shown to be slightly inferior to Hilbert in terms of data 
utility [45]. 
Soria-Comas et al. proposed and evaluated microaggregation based algorithms to generate k-
anonymous t-close data sets.  They modified the microaggregation algorithm for it to take t-
closeness into account at the moment of cluster formation, in an attempt to improve the utility of 
the anonymised data set [14].  
-Presence model was employed by two algorithms, SPALM and MPALM.  They both took 
advantage of anti-monotonicity property of -Presence, which says if a generalized table is not -
Present, the less generalized table that locates below that table in the generalization lattice is not 
-Present either.  This leads to pruning search space in top down lattice search.  These two 
algorithms differ in the way they generalize quasi-identifiers, SPALM does global generalization 
while MPALM locally generalizes the values [35]. The extended model, c-Confident -Presence, 
uses similar algorithm, SFALM which is modified version of SPALM that accepts a confidence 
threshold and a public distribution instead of a public table [36]. 
Slicing is a new algorithm that addresses many issues at the same time.  It addressed the limitation 
of generalization, such as high information loss, losing the correlation between quasi-identifiers, 
and curse of dimensionality.  Therefore, it uses bucketization to prevent facing these drawbacks.  
However, it also pointed some limitations for bucketization as well, like not preventing 
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membership disclosure and losing the correlation between quasi-identifiers and sensitive attribute.  
Therefore, Slicing modified the bucketization approach by merging highly correlated attributes 
into columns and then apply bucketization on those columns.  In this way, it is showing that the 
data utility is highly preserved and also membership disclosure is also prevented [40]. This 
approach is also extended to “Overlapping Slicing” which allows creating overlapping columns 
that have some attributes in common.  This extension came for enhancing the data utility by 
preserving more correlations [46].             
2.3 Disclosure Risk Measures 
Thus far, we have reviewed privacy models introduced in the literature as well as privacy 
techniques proposed to satisfy the privacy requirements of the models. Privacy requirements 
specified by privacy models are parametric. The parameters express the privacy level and they can 
be tuned to preserve privacy of the individuals in a confidential data, up to a desired level. As we 
have discussed, the more we preserve individual’s privacy, the more we lose data utility. Privacy 
models are compared one to another with respect to the information loss they incur.  
Torra stated that privacy models can be seen as Boolean condition for disclosure [12]. It means 
the privacy requirement is like a Boolean condition for disclosure; when a confidential data 
satisfies the requirement, it implies that there is no disclosure risk. Therefore, in the literature, the 
works proposing privacy models do not measure disclosure risk after applying the model on the 
dataset.  
However, in the literature, some disclosure risk measures have been introduced to evaluate privacy 
techniques that are not counted as Boolean condition for disclosure. Besides privacy models, in 
the literature, there is an area named Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC), in which various 
techniques have been proposed to modify confidential microdata in order to limit disclosure. After 
applying these techniques to a confidential microdata and create a privacy protected dataset, they 
are evaluated based on a disclosure risk measure calculated on the protected dataset. Several 
statistical disclosure control techniques are such as sampling, adding noise, rounding, data 
swapping, etc.  
Disclosure risk measures introduced in the literature are classified based on the type of disclosure: 
identity disclosure or attribute disclosure. Most works have focused on identity disclosure risk 
while some considered attribute disclosure risk. 
2.3.1 Identity Disclosure Risk Measures 
For measuring identity disclosure risk, we need to specify key attributes of the dataset. Key 
attributes are the same as quasi-identifiers; they are attributes which incur identity disclosure 
because they might be known for individuals from public data sources.  
There are two types of identity disclosure risk measures; Uniqueness and Re-identification.  
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Uniqueness  
This measure is less common than Re-identification measure because it is only used when the 
statistical disclosure control technique is sampling. Sampling is one of the SDC techniques which 
reduces disclosure risk by selecting only a subset of records from the initial microdata. The original 
confidential dataset is the population dataset and the privacy protected dataset is the sample 
dataset. Based on Uniqueness measure, identity disclosure risk is defined as the probability that 
the rare combination of key attribute values in the sample dataset is indeed rare in the population 
dataset.   
Re-identification    
In this type of risk measure, we assume an adversary has access to an external dataset containing 
direct identifiers and some quasi-identifiers for individuals. Having this external knowledge, the 
adversary wants to link the victim’s quasi-identifiers to quasi-identifiers in the protected dataset in 
order to find a matched record and disclose the confidential information of the victim from the 
protected dataset. Thus, re-identification occurs when an adversary could identify a victim’s record 
in the protected dataset by matching it with his external knowledge based on the key attribute 
values. Consequently, this type of risk measure, estimates the number of re-identifications that an 
adversary can obtain.  
Re-identification is done through record linkage algorithms which are either probabilistic-based 
or distance-based.  
Probabilistic-based record linkage algorithms assign weights to each pair of records in the original 
and protected dataset, indicating the likelihood that the two records referring to the same 
individual. Then, pairs with weights higher than a specified threshold are labeled as “linked”. 
Finally, disclosure risk measure is the percentage of records in the privacy protected dataset which 
are labeled as “linked”.        
Distance-based record linkage algorithms compute distances between records in the original 
dataset and the protected dataset. For every record in the protected dataset, the nearest record in 
original dataset is marked as “linked”. Disclosure risk measure is then defined as the percentage 
of records marked as “linked” in the protected dataset. This type of algorithms are compute-
intensive and thus might not be applicable for large datasets. 
One limitation of re-identification risk measure is that making assumptions about an adversary’s 
exact external knowledge is a difficult task and a data publisher cannot perfectly model adversary’s 
background knowledge. Domingo-Ferrer addressed this issue and proposed a “maximum 
knowledge attacker model” [9]. This model assumes that the adversary has access to the maximum 
information about individuals and therefore considers the worst-case scenario for disclosure. The 
maximum information about individuals that an adversary can access and incur the maximum 
disclosure risk, is the original confidential dataset itself. In fact, this model, assumes that the 
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adversary knows all the original key attribute values of the individuals in the confidential dataset, 
and use this information for applying re-identification and measuring disclosure risk.  
2.3.2 Attribute Disclosure Risk Measures 
Attribute disclosure risk measures are less studied in the literature compared to identity disclosure 
risk measures, because the privacy models used, such as l-diversity or t-closeness are not 
measurable in terms of disclosure risk; they are just Boolean conditions.    
Nin et al. proposed an attribute disclosure risk measure for categorical sensitive attributes [10]. 
Their proposed approach is to build a classifier and use privacy protected dataset as the training 
dataset to predict the sensitive attribute value. Then the original confidential dataset is used as a 
testing dataset. Finally, the percentage of original records that are correctly classified will be 
considered as an estimation of the attribute disclosure risk. In other words, the accuracy of the 
classifier would be the measure of attribute disclosure risk.  
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3 FLEXIBLE ADVERSARY DISCLOSURE RISK (FADR) MEASURE 
In this chapter, we develop a generalized privacy disclosure risk measure, called FADR (Flexible 
Adversary Disclosure Risk) measure, at record level, which considers both identity and attribute 
disclosure attack concurrently. We define FADR measure as the product of likelihood and 
consequence estimators. The likelihood of a record shows how probable the record is to be re-
identified by any adversary. The consequence is then measured in terms of the sensitivity level of 
the information to be revealed for the record after re-identification. Thus, likelihood is a measure 
of identity disclosure and consequence represents attribute disclosure. 
FADR measure considers all possible scenarios for an adversary’s external knowledge and 
disclosure target by counting any subsets of attributes to be known or unknown by an adversary. 
Instead of restricting the adversary’s knowledge to one set of attributes as QIDs, and the 
adversary’s disclosure target to one set of attributes as SAs, we iteratively split attributes into two 
sets of known and unknown attributes to consider any combination of attributes once to be known 
and once to be unknown. The attributes in the known set act as QIDs and the ones in the unknowns 
set can be counted as SAs. 
Moreover, our approach gives the data publisher the flexibility to assign high weight to attributes 
which are more probable to be publicly known about individuals in the underlying dataset as well 
as the flexibility to as-sign high weight to attributes which contain more sensitive information 
about individuals. This weighting makes known sets containing more probable attributes and 
unknown sets comprising more sensitive attributes, have higher impact on FADR measure. 
To handle computation complexity, we proposed an efficient algorithm to prune the branches of 
known and unknown sets that have low contribution in FADR measure. 
In summary, our contributions in this chapter include: 
 Presenting FADR measure as a single combined metric of disclosure risk, which 
measures both identity and attribute disclosure concurrently.   
 Considering all possible scenarios for an adversary’s external knowledge and disclosure 
targets by iteratively splitting attributes into two sets of known and unknown sets.  
 Providing the flexibility to data publisher for weighing high probable or sensitive 
attributes to have higher impact on FADR measure. 
 Handling the computation complexity of FADR measure including large number of 
known and unknown sets, by proposing a pruning algorithm that removes sets with low 
contribution in risk calculation.    
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3.1 FADR Measure  
FADR measure is defined based on risk assessment methodology. In risk assessment, risk contains 
two components multiplied with each other-i.e., likelihood and consequence. FADR measure is 
defined likewise for each record r in the dataset. 
3.1.1 Single Combined Metric for Measuring Identity & Attribute Disclosure 
In FADR measure, we use likelihood as a measure of identity disclosure and consequence for 
measuring at-tribute disclosure. Thus, FADR, as a single combined disclosure risk measure, is 
defined as: 
 𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) = 𝐿(𝑟) × 𝐶(𝑟), (3) 
where 𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) is the disclosure risk, 𝐿(𝑟) likelihood, and 𝐶(𝑟) the consequence of a record r, 
respectively. 𝐿(𝑟) indicates the likelihood of record r to be re-identified by an adversary. 𝐶(𝑟) 
specifies that given r is re-identified, what is the sensitivity of the private information of r being 
revealed?    
3.1.2 Considering All Possible Scenarios for an Adversary’s External Knowledge and 
Disclosure Targets 
FADR measure considers all possible scenarios for an adversary’s external knowledge and 
disclosure target by counting any subset of attributes to be known or unknown by an adversary. 
We iteratively split attributes into known and unknown attribute sets. A known set contains 
attributes, which an adversary knows about a victim (QIDs). The remaining attributes form the 
unknown set and are attributes, which may contain private information (SAs) an adversary wants 
to disclose about a victim. The unknown set is a complement set of the known set. We consider 
all possible attributes’ splitting. Thus, we allow an attribute to appear in a known set of a split and 
in an unknown set of another split. Therefore, we count all possible scenarios for an adversary’s 
external knowledge (known set) and disclosure targets (unknown set). Since each attribute has 2 
possibilities − i.e., being in the known set or in the unknown set – given m number of attributes, 
the total number of known/unknown sets is equal to 2𝑚. This number includes two cases of having 
all attributes as a known set (empty unknown set) and all attributes as an unknown set (empty 
known set). The two cases incur no disclosure since there is no disclosure target in the former case 
and no external knowledge to be used to find victims in the latter case. Excluding the two cases 
from all possible scenarios, FADR measure, defined in Eq. (3), is then calculated over all 2𝑚 − 2  
sets, and is extended as: 
 
𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) = ∑ 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) ×  𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) ,
2𝑚−2
𝑖=1
 
(4) 
where 𝐾𝑆𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ known set of attributes and 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ unknown set of attributes. 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 
is the complement set of 𝐾𝑆𝑖.  Likelihood is calculated based on the known set and consequence 
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is derived from the unknown set. Thus, 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) is the likelihood of the record r being re-identified 
through attributes in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set, and 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) is the consequence of the record r being re-
identified in terms of the amount of private information in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ unknown set being disclosed for 
this record. 
3.1.3 Weighting Highly Probable Known Sets 
As described in Section 3.1.2, FADR measure provides the opportunity for any subset of attributes 
to be known by an adversary, which results in counting 2𝑚 − 2 number of known sets. Although 
an adversary with any external knowledge may exist, in practice, some subsets of attributes are 
more probable to be publicly known than others. Therefore, in our approach, we give the data 
publisher the flexibility to assign probability to each attribute, indicating how probable the attribute 
is to be publicly known about individuals in the underlying dataset. To make our pruning algorithm 
(present in section 3.2) tractable and for the ease of use by users of our measure, it is assumed that 
publicly known probability of each attribute is independent from one another. Thus, publicly 
known probability of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set, shown is Eq. (5), is computed as the multiplication of the 
publicly known probabilities of the attributes in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set and the publicly unknown 
probabilities (compliment probability) of the attributes which are not in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set, i.e., 
they exist in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ unknown set. In our terminology, publicly known and unknown probability 
are noted as 𝑃𝐾 and 𝑃𝑈𝐾, respectively.  
 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) = ∏ 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗)
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝐾𝑆𝑖
× ∏ 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘)
𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
 
(5) 
𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗) is the publicly known probability of 𝐴𝑗, 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘) is the publicly unknown probability of 
𝐴𝑘, 𝐴𝑗 is the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ attribute in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set (𝐾𝑆𝑖) and 𝐴𝑘 is the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ attribute in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ unknown 
set (𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖). 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘) is the complement probability of 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑘), and thereby computed as:  
 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘) = 1 − 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑘). (6) 
We use 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) in calculating 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟). However, 𝐾𝑆𝑖 can be very likely to be publicly known 
while 𝐾𝑆𝑖’s attribute values for the record 𝑟 might occur frequently in the dataset. Thus, an 
adversary will find several matched records for 𝑟 and consequently the likelihood of identity 
disclosure for 𝑟 is decreased. Therefore, we also need to consider the frequency of 𝐾𝑆𝑖’s attribute 
values for the record 𝑟, in formulating likelihood in FADR measure. Hence, 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) is derived as  
 
𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) = 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖)  ×  1 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖])⁄  , (7) 
where 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) is the publicly known probability of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ known set derived from Eq. (5), 𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖] 
is 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set’s attribute values for the record 𝑟, and 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖] ) is the number of 
occurrences of 𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖] in the dataset. 
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Known sets comprised of attributes with higher values of 𝑃𝐾 increase the first term in Eq. (7), and 
therefore lead to higher likelihood of identity disclosure, compared to other known sets containing 
attributes with lower values of 𝑃𝐾. This makes highly probable known sets have higher impact on 
FADR measure compared to low probable known sets, since FADR measure is calculated over all 
possible known sets. The data publisher has the flexibility to apply this impact on FADR measure 
by assigning 𝑃𝐾 to each attribute.  
The second term in Eq. (7) considers the values of the known set of attributes for the record 𝑟. 
Then it counts the number of occurrences of those values together in the whole dataset. If this 
count is large, it means a large number of records have these values and the person whom record 
𝑟 belongs to is less likely to be re-identified by those attributes. Therefore, the count is inversely 
correlated with the likelihood. Including this term, likelihood is no longer a probability function. 
However, for each record it is still a value between 0 and 1. 
One of the well-known re-identification risks used in the literature is prosecutor risk [47, 48]. This 
only measures identity disclosure, by considering specific attributes as QIDs. For a record 𝑟, based 
on a specific attributes as QIDs, prosecutor risk is measured as the inverse frequency of QID-
values of the record 𝑟 in the dataset, as shown in Eq. (8).   
 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝐼𝐷(𝑟) =  1 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[QID])⁄  (8) 
Theorem 1. 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) =  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝐼𝐷(𝑟), if the attributes in 𝐾𝑆𝑖 are QID attributes and 
∀𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝐾𝑆𝑖: 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗) = 1 and ∀𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖: 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑘) = 0. 
Proof. Based on Eq. (6), ∀𝐴𝑘 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖: 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑘) = 1 − 0 = 1. Therefore, 𝑃𝐾 of known attributes 
and 𝑃𝑈𝐾 of unknown attributes are 1. Thus, following Eq. (5), 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) = 1. Substituting in 
likelihood formula shown in Eq. (7), likelihood of record 𝑟 based on 𝐾𝑆𝑖 is simplified to 
 1 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[𝐾𝑆𝑖])⁄ . Since we assumed 𝐾𝑆𝑖 contains QID attributes, 𝐾𝑆𝑖 = 𝑄𝐼𝐷 and thereby 
𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) =   1 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟[QID])⁄ = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑄𝐼𝐷(𝑟).               
3.1.4 Weighting Sensitive Unknown Sets 
The consequence term in FADR measure considers attribute disclosure attack. After finding how 
likely the record r is to be identified, we measure how much private information of record r is 
revealed. Referring to section 3.1.2, any subset of attributes can be appeared in an unknown set to 
consider all possible scenarios for an adversary’s disclosure target. However, attributes can be of 
different levels of sensitivity, depending on how much private information they hold and how 
much individuals are sensitive about those information. 
For example, attribute disease is more sensitive than attribute occupation - people are typically 
stricter in keeping their disease information personal and private compared to their occupation 
information. Even within an attribute, some values can be more sensitive than the others. For 
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instance, within the values of attribute disease, cancer is of the higher severity level compared to 
flu, and thus likely to be of higher privacy concern.  
Considering different sensitivity levels provides better modeling of attribute disclosure attack. 
Thus, in our approach, we give data publisher the flexibility to assign sensitivity weights to both 
attributes and their values in the underlying dataset. The attribute sensitivity weights must be 
integer values between 0 and 100, and the value sensitivity weights must be integer values between 
0 and 1. The larger values imply higher sensitivity and incur higher consequence values in our risk 
measure.  
Having sensitivity weights assigned for attributes and their values, we define 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) as: 
 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) =  ∑ ( 𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗) × S𝑊(𝑟[𝐴𝑗]))
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
 , 
(9) 
where 𝑟[𝐴𝑗] is the value of 𝐴𝑗 for record 𝑟,  𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗) is the sensitivity weight of 𝐴𝑗, and 𝑆𝑊(𝑟[𝐴𝑗] ) 
is the sensitivity weight of 𝑟[𝐴𝑗], the value of 𝐴𝑗 in record r.    
Equation (9) indicates that the consequence of a record 𝑟 based on the 𝑖𝑡ℎ unknown set depends 
on sensitivity weights of the attributes in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ unknown set and the sensitivity weights of 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
unknown set’s attribute values of the record 𝑟. Unknown sets comprising high sensitive attributes 
incur high consequence values for the records having high sensitive attribute values as well. 
Therefore, they have higher impact on FADR measure, compared to lower sensitive unknown sets. 
Hence, data publisher has the flexibility to make influence on FADR measure by assigning 
sensitivity weights to attributes and their values.  
3.1.5 FADR Bound and Normalization  
In this section, we want to measure the maximum and minimum risk of disclosure that can happen 
for a victim in any dataset with specific size and attributes, based on our FADR measure. Such 
bound is defined according to the specified publicly known probabilities and sensitivity weights 
for the attributes. Having such parameters set, FADR measure maximizes when the known tuple 
of the victim appears only once in a dataset and the corresponding unknown tuple disclosed has 
the maximum sensitivity weight of 1. Therefore, the maximum FADR is formulated as,   
 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = ∑(𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) × 1 ×  ∑ ( S𝑊(𝐴𝑗) × 1))
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖𝑖
 (10) 
The minimum FADR value for a victim depends on the same parameters as well as the size of 
confidential dataset. FADR measure minimizes when the known tuple of the victim appears in all 
the records of the dataset and the corresponding unknown tuples disclosed have negligible 
sensitivity weights. Since such weights are between 0 and 1, we can consider 0.001 as a trivial 
value. 
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𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 =  ∑(𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) ×
1
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡
×  ∑ ( S𝑊(𝐴𝑗) × 0.001))
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖𝑖
 
(11) 
With FADR bound being specified with the assigned parameters, we can normalize the derived 
FADR values of the records in a dataset, as shown in Eq. (12), to be between 0 and 1. 
 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) =  (𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅(𝑟) − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅) (𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅)⁄  (12) 
3.1.6 An Illustrative Example 
In this section, we give an example of calculating likelihood and consequence of a known and 
unknown set of a record in the sample microdata, shown in Table 2. Since there are 5 attributes in 
the sample microdata, and each attribute can be appeared in the known set and unknown set, totally 
there are 25 − 2 = 30 known and unknown sets of attributes. For example, {age, gender, race} 
can be a known set and {income, disease} would be the complement unknown set. Another known 
set can be {age, gender, race, income} with {disease} as the complement unknown set.    
We assigned probabilities and sensitivity weights as shown in Table 3. In practice, the data 
publisher has the flexibility to set these values based on the underlying dataset. For instance, 
according to our assigned values in Table 3, we consider attribute gender to be 80% probable to 
be publicly known, whereas disease is set to be 0.1% probable to be publicly known for the 
members of this dataset. Therefore, a known set containing gender will lead to higher likelihood 
and thereby more contribution in risk measure, compared to a known set including disease. As 
another example, we set attribute sensitivity weight of 90 for income and 0 for race. This incurs a 
higher consequence value and thereby has more impact on FADR measure for an unknown set 
containing income than for one having race. In addition, records having income values less than 
40K or more than 70K, are set to have higher value sensitivity weights than records in the middle-
income levels, and thereby higher consequence value for an unknown set containing income. Value 
sensitivity weights for age, gender, and race are not defined in Table 3 because in computing 
consequence derived from Eq. (9), value sensitivity weights will be multiplied with attribute 
sensitivity weights that are 0 for these attributes.  
Table 2. Sample microdata 
 Age Gender Race Income Disease 
𝒓𝟏 34 Male Black 60K Flu 
𝒓𝟐 19 Female White 36K Flu 
𝒓𝟑 40 Male Asian-Pac-Islander 45K Flu 
𝒓𝟒 34 Male Black 50K Cancer 
𝒓𝟓 51 Female Black 65K Flu 
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Table 3. Probabilities and sensitivity weights for sample microdata 
Attribute 
Publicly 
Known 
Probability 
Attribute 
Sensitivity 
Weight 
Value 
Sensitivity 
Weight 
 Values Weight 
Age 0.3 0  ----- 
Gender 0.8 0  ----- 
Race 0.6 0  ----- 
Income 0.005 90 
<40K or >70K 1 
[40K-70K] 0.7 
Disease 0.001 100 
Flu 0.2 
Cancer 1 
 
Based on Eq. (10) and Eq. (11), the maximum and minimum FADR value for a victim’s record 
incurred by any confidential dataset with the same size (n=5) and attributes (age, gender, race, 
income, and disease) as the sample microdata in Table 2, along with the assigned publicly known 
probabilities and attribute sensitivity weights shown in Table 3, are calculated below.    
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 =  ∑(𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) ×  ∑ 𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗))
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
30
𝑖=1
=  178.87 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 =  ∑(𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) ×
1
5
× ∑ (𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗) × 0.001))
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
30
𝑖=1
=  0.035 
Likelihood and consequence for 𝑟4 in the sample microdata, based on the known set {age, gender, 
race} and the unknown set {income, disease}, are derived as: 
𝐿{𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟,𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒}(𝑟4) = (0.3 × 0.8 × 0.6 × (1 − 0.005) × (1 − 0.001) ) × (1 2⁄ ) =  0.071 
𝐶{𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒}(𝑟4) = (90 × 0.7) + (100 × 1) = 163 
3.2 Calculation Efficiency 
FADR measure, shown in Eq. (4), is calculated over all possible known/unknown sets of attributes 
– i.e., 2𝑚 − 2 number of sets where m is the number of attributes in the dataset. Calculating FADR 
measure can be computationally expensive in datasets with large number of attributes, due to the 
30 
 
exponential growth in the number of known/unknown sets. To make FADR measure 
computationally feasible, we reduce the number of known/unknown sets by pruning the branches 
of sets having very low contribution in the risk measure. We propose a pruning algorithm, which 
removes known/unknown sets of attributes, which have very low value of the product of likelihood 
and consequence.  
As shown in Eq. (7), the second term of likelihood depends on the record values and value 
sensitivity weights in Eq. (9) make consequence values different for different records. Our pruning 
algorithm should prune the known/unknown sets, which result in very low disclosure risk 
contribution for any record. Therefore, we assume the worst record, which incurs the highest 
likelihood and consequence for any known/unknown set. We prune known/unknown sets incurring 
very low product of likelihood and consequence for the worst record and thereby the pruned 
known/unknown sets would have very low product of likelihood and consequence for any other 
records. The worst record has the maximum value of the second term of likelihood and sensitivity 
weight, which both are the value 1. Hence, the worst record disclosure risk measure will be 
simplified as   
 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅𝐾𝑆𝑖/𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 =  𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖)  × ∑ 𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑗)
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
, 
(13) 
and our pruning algorithm prunes branches of known/unknown sets having 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 value of 
less than a threshold 𝜀.    
Since 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) is based on the product of probabilities, it follows that if one probability is less 
than a value, any probability multiplied with that will result in a smaller value. Therefore, we 
construct a tree of attributes, order by their publicly known and unknown probabilities. Each node 
is either a known or an unknown attribute and represents the subset of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known and unknown 
set made from the node’s attribute and all the attributes in the ancestors. The height of this tree is 
equal to the number of attributes (𝑚). Therefore, each leaf node represents the complete 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
known/unknown set and 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) is derived at each leaf node by multiplying probabilities of the 
leaf and its ancestors. Traversing tree from the root to the leaves, attribute probabilities (𝑃𝐾 and 
𝑃𝑈𝐾) are monotonically decreasing. Our algorithm calculates the partial 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) at each node 
by multiplying the node’s probability with the probabilities of the ancestors. If the partial 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) 
is less than a value, all the complete known/unknown sets represented in the leaves of the subtree 
at this node will have publicly known probabilities of a smaller value. 
Our algorithm also needs to check the second term in (13), which represents the consequence. 
However, this term is not monotonically decreasing in the constructed tree. Therefore, at each 
node, by looking at the attributes in the descendants, we find the complete unknown set with the 
maximum consequence value, which is the sum of unknown attribute sensitivity weights. 
Accordingly, traversing from the root to the leaves of the tree, the maximum consequence value 
either remains the same or decreases. Thus, at each node, we multiply the partial 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) with 
the maximum consequence value, and if it gets lower than a threshold 𝜀, all the complete 
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known/unknown sets represented in the leaves of the subtree at the node, will have the value for 
this product lower than 𝜀 as well. Hence, our algorithm prunes the subtree at a node having this 
product lower than 𝜀.  
 
Table 4. Sorted list of all probabilities for the sample microdata 
𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟓) 𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟒) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟐) 𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟏) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟑) 𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟑) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟏) 𝑷𝑼𝑲 (𝑨𝟐) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟒) 𝑷𝑲 (𝑨𝟓) 
99.9% 99.5% 80% 70% 60% 40% 30% 20% 0.5% 0.1% 
 
 
Figure 4. Part of the constructed tree for the sample microdata 
For instance, back to the sample microdata in Table 2, and the assigned probabilities shown in 
Table 3, first we create a sorted list of all known and unknown probabilities, shown in Table 4. 
Then, we construct a tree accordingly. A part of a constructed tree is demonstrated in Figure 4 with 
attribute indices written in the nodes. In the tree, the attributes with the prime sign are classified 
into unknown set and the attributes without prime sign are classified into the known set. For 
example, the leftmost leaf node represents {𝐴2, 𝐴3} as the known set and {𝐴1, 𝐴4, 𝐴5} as the 
unknown set.  
Figure 5 shows an example of the way we prune a branch of the tree. This figure just shows a 
sample branch and does not show the subtree at the node. The publicly known probability of each 
subset is written next to each node, on the left column. The maximum consequence at each node 
is shown next to each node on the right column. At the node {5′}, a complete unknown set having 
the maximum  consequence is the one with 𝐴5 and 𝐴4 as the unknown attributes, which results in 
100+90 consequence value. However, at the node {3}, since the tree is in the order of probabilities, 
we don’t have 𝐴4 as the unknown attribute in the subtree and instead we have 𝐴4 as the known 
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attribute. That is why the maximum consequence at this node is 100, which is just for having 𝐴5 
as the only unknown attribute. Consider the pruning threshold 𝜀 to be 2%. By moving towards the 
leaf and calculating the probabilities times maximum consequence, we can see that the probability 
of {3, 1, 4} known set and {5, 2} unknown set becomes 0.00017 and the maximum consequence 
value is 100. Therefore, 0.00017  100 equals to 0.017 which is less than 0.2 and therefore the tree 
is pruned from that node. 
 
  
Figure 5. The pruning process example 
Algorithm 1 shows our proposed pruning algorithm for removing known/unknown sets having low 
contribution in the risk measure. The inputs of our algorithm are the list of attributes in the dataset 
and the assigned publicly known probability and sensitivity weight for each attribute. The output 
is the list of known/unknown sets remained after pruning. Having publicly known probabilities of 
the attributes, we calculate publicly unknown probabilities based on (6). Then, we sort all the 
attributes, to both be known and unknown, in descending order of their probabilities, and write 
them in the variable 𝑆 (line 2). For example, looking at the Table 4, 𝑆 would be {5′, 4′, 2, 1′, 3, 
3′, 1, 2′, 4, 5} (showing attribute indices only). Each attribute appears twice in this list, one to be 
known and one to be unknown (with prime sign). Therefore the length of 𝑆 is 2𝑚. 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 
contains subsets of known and unknown attributes with the 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 value of (13) more than 𝜀. 
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 is initiated by an empty subset. 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 contains subsets of attributes; each 
corresponds to one subset in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆, showing a set of remaining attributes that can be appended 
to the subset in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 for enlarging the subset. 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 is initiated by all attributes as the 
candidates to be appended to the empty set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆, which is 𝑆. 𝑖 is a pointer sweeping 
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 and 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 to point to the current subset and select it for checking whether it needs 
to be enlarged or pruned. 𝑖 is initiated by 0 and line 5 of the algorithm shows that the first subset 
to select is the last set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆. Pointer starts from the last set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 and sweeps 
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towards the first set. Whenever a new subset is appended to the 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆, the pointer is reset to 
0 to restart sweeping from the last set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆. 
After a subset is selected (line 5), its remaining attributes, selected from the corresponding set in 
𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 6), should be appended one by one to the selected subset and create a partial set 
to check (line 8). Each time the publicly known probability of the partial set (line 11) and the sum 
of sensitivity weights of the partial set and the next unknown attributes (line 14) are calculated, 
and the product of these two terms, based on (8), will be 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅. We checked the value of 
𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 (line 16). If it is more than 𝜀: 
 The partial set is appended to 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 17). 
 The set of remaining attributes for the partial set need to be appended to 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 
(line 18). The remaining attributes must not contain a known/an unknown attribute, 
which already exists as an unknown/a known in the partial set (line 12 and 13). 
 If the length of the partial set is equal to the number of attributes, it implies that it is a 
complete known/unknown set and we have reached the leaf node of the tree. So, the 
algorithm outputs the set (line 19). Then, 𝑖 is incremented by one (line 29) to select the 
prior subset in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 5) and its corresponding remaining attributes in 
𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 6) to process. If the length of the partial set is not equal to the number 
of attributes, we need to continue enlarging the partial set when there are still attributes 
remained for enlarging (line 7). Since the partial set was added to the end of 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆, 𝑖 
is reset to 0 to start sweeping 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 and 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 from the end.    
else: 
 The partial set is not appended to the SUBSETS and not selected for enlarging. 
Therefore, the partial set is pruned and consequently all the known/unknown sets 
comprising this partial set are pruned.  
 Then the algorithm continues with the subset selected earlier in line 5, and appends the 
next attribute to create a new partial set (line 8), if any attribute remained (line 7). 
Whenever no more attributes remained for the selected subset (line 28), 𝑖 is incremented by one 
(line 29) to select the prior subset in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 and its corresponding remaining attributes in 
𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 (line 5 and 6) and again these attributes are appended one by one and each time the 
𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 is checked. This loop continues until no more subset is remained in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 which 
its remaining attributes are not appended and their 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 value are not checked (line 4).   
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Algorithm 1. Pruning Low Risk Sets 
Input:  
Attributes {𝐴1, 𝐴2, …, 𝐴𝑚}; Publicly Known Probability of Attributes {𝑃𝐾(𝐴1), 𝑃𝐾(𝐴2), … , 
𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑚)}; Sensitivity Weight of Attributes {𝑆𝑊(𝐴1), 𝑆𝑊(𝐴2), … , 𝑆𝑊(𝐴𝑚)}; Pruning threshold 𝜀; 
Output: 
Remaining known/unknown sets after pruning; 
Algorithm: 
1: {𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴1), 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴2), … , 𝑃𝑈𝐾(𝐴𝑚)} = {1 − 𝑃𝐾(𝐴1), 1 − 𝑃𝐾(𝐴2), … , 1 − 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑚)};  
2: 𝑆 = sorted list of attributes to be both known and unknown in descending order of attribute’s 𝑃𝐾 
and 𝑃𝑈𝐾;  
3: 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 = {{}}; 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 = {{𝑆}}; 𝑖 = 0; 
4: while (𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) − 𝑖) ! = 0  do 
5:  𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) − 𝑖 );   
6:  𝑛𝑥𝑡 = 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) − 𝑖 );   
7:  while 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑛𝑥𝑡) ! = 0 do 
8:   𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 = 𝑠𝑢𝑏 union first attribute in 𝑛𝑥𝑡; 
9:   Delete first attribute in 𝑛𝑥𝑡; 
10:   𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆) − 𝑖 ) = 𝑛𝑥𝑡; 
11:   𝑃𝐾_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 = 𝑃𝐾(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡) calculated from (3); 
12:   Remove known attributes in 𝑛𝑥𝑡 which exist in 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 as unknown; 
13:   Remove unknown attributes in 𝑛𝑥𝑡 which exist in 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 as known; 
14:   𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞 = sum of sensitivity weights of unknown attributes in 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡    
and 𝑛𝑥𝑡; 
15:   𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝑃𝐾_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 ×  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞 
16:   if 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 >  𝜀 then 
17:    Append 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡 to 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆; 
18:    Append 𝑛𝑥𝑡 to 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆; 
19:    if 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡) == 𝑚 then  
20:     Output 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑒𝑡  
21:     Break; 
22:    else 
23:     𝑠𝑢𝑏 = last set in 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆; 
24:     𝑛𝑥𝑡 = last set in 𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆; 
25:     𝑖 = 0; 
26:    end if 
27:   end if 
28:  end while 
29:  𝑖 + + 
30: end while 
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3.3 Experiments 
In our experiments, we used a sample dataset from the UCI machine learning repository Adult 
dataset*, extracted from the 1994 Census database. Our Adult sample dataset contains 9 attributes 
of Age, Work class, Education, Marital status, Occupation, Race, Gender, Country, Income, and 
30162 records after eliminating missing values.  
 
Table 5. Assigned PKs and SWs for Adult sample dataset 
Attribute 
Publicly 
Known 
Probability 
Sensitivity 
Weight of 
Attributes 
Sensitivity Weight of  
Attribute Values 
 
 Values Weight 
Age (𝑨𝟏) 0.3 0 all values 0 
Work class (𝑨𝟐) 0.1 100 
without pay 1 
Other than 
"without pay” 
0.1 
Education (𝑨𝟑) 
 
 
0.1 100 
primary school 1 
Other than 
"primary school” 
0 
Marital status 
(𝑨𝟒) 
0.01 0 all values 0 
Occupation (𝑨𝟓) 0.05 100 all values 1 
Race (𝑨𝟔) 0.6 0 all values 0 
Gender (𝑨𝟕) 0.8 0 all values 0 
Country (𝑨𝟖) 0.2 0 all values 0 
Income (𝑨𝟗) 0.001 100 all values 1 
 
To calculate FADR measure for our Adult sample dataset, we assigned publicly known 
probabilities and sensitivity weights to the attributes as shown in Table 5. We assumed the gender 
attribute is the most probable attribute to be publicly known about individuals (80%), followed by 
race (60%), age (30%), and country of origin (20%). We considered the occupation and income of 
individuals as their most private information, regardless of the values (sensitivity weight of 100 
for the attributes and 1 for all the values). Work class and education of the underlying individuals 
can be assumed as their sensitive information based on their values. For example, if their work 
class is assigned “without pay”, that implies they have no income. In addition, the individuals 
                                                 
* https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult 
36 
 
underlying our sample dataset are all older than 16 years old. Therefore, if their education is stated 
as “primary school” it reveals that they have dropped out of school. As a result, we assigned 
sensitivity weight of 1 to “without pay” work class and “primary school” education. 
The experiments are conducted on a machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3632QM CPU (2.20 
GHz) and 8 GB RAM, programmed with R 3.3.2 software.  
 
3.3.1 Evaluating FADR measure 
In this experiment, we evaluate the FADR measure on the Adult sample dataset. We derived the 
FADR values for all the records based on Eq. (4). We used the parameter values shown in Table 
5 with the pruning threshold (𝜀) of 0.01. The sum of all the records’ FADR value that represents 
the whole dataset’s disclosure risk (Total FADR) is derived as 72,917. Besides, we obtained the 
normalized FADR value for each record according to Eq. (12). Figure 6  shows the frequency of 
the records within each category of normalized FADR values. 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of the normalized FADR values among the records. 
We identified a record 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 in our dataset with the maximum FADR value, which is at the highest 
risk of disclosure. Such record has the normalized FADR value of 19.16%, and the FADR value 
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of 69.33. Looking at the values of 𝐿𝐾𝑆(𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥) × 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆(𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥) for all the known/unknown sets, 
we found that the known set {Age, Race, Gender} and the corresponding unknown set {Work class, 
Education, Marital status, Occupation, Country, Income} has the highest value of 27.18 among 
all other sets, with the contribution of 39% (27.18 69.33⁄ ) in the FADR calculation for this record. 
This implies the fact that 39% of the disclosure risk of 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 is incurred by an adversary who 
knows the age, ethnicity, and gender of this victim without knowing the rest of information that 
are exposed to disclosure. The remaining 61% of FADR value is derived by considering other 
possible adversaries with different external knowledge and disclosure targets.    
The likelihood value of 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 obtained from the aforementioned known/unknown set is equal to 
0.087, which means there is 8.7% of chance for the specified adversary to identify 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 (identity 
disclosure). This value is derived from the probability of publicly knowing {Age, Race, Gender} 
and not knowing {Work class, Education, Marital status, Occupation, Country, Income} (equals 
0.087) multiplied by the inverse frequency of the values of {Age, Race, Gender} for 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 in our 
dataset (equals 1). 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 has the known set values of {63, other, male}, which only appears once 
in the whole dataset. This is the first reason to make such record at the highest risk of disclosure.  
Besides, the consequence value of 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 incurred by the aforementioned unknown set, is equal to 
310. This value indicates the level of disclosure that will happen if the victim of 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 is found in 
the dataset (attribute disclosure). The unknown set of values for 𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑥 is {Private, Preschool, 
Married-civ-spouse, Prof-specialty, Mexico, <=50}, which contains the sensitive attributes of 
occupation (SW=100) and income (SW=100) regardless of the values, in addition to the sensitive 
attributes of work class (SW=100) and education (SW=100), for which the values are private 
(SW=0.1) and preschool (SW=1), respectively. Therefore, the consequence is derived as 100 + 
100 + (100×0.1) + (100×1) = 310. The second reason that makes such record at the highest risk of 
disclosure is that all the sensitive attributes exist in the unknown set for the specified adversary 
and the record has the highest sensitive value for education attribute as well.    
3.3.2 Likelihood Measure in FADR vs. Prosecutor Risk Measure 
As described in Section 3.1.1, the likelihood term in FADR measure captures identity disclosure 
risk. Also, in Section 3.1.3, we mentioned that the prosecutor risk is a well-known identity 
disclosure risk measure and in Theorem 1 we proved that the prosecutor risk measure is a 
simplified version of the likelihood measure in FADR. However, the prosecutor risk measure 
restricts the adversary’s knowledge to a specific set of attributes as QIDs. In Section 3.1.2, we 
addressed this limitation by showing that our approach considers all possible external knowledge 
for an adversary. The identity disclosure risk value measured by either prosecutor risk or our 
likelihood measure in FADR, is between zero and one.   
In this experiment, we compared the likelihood measure in FADR, as a measure of identity 
disclosure risk, with the prosecutor risk measure, to evaluate the effect of considering all possible 
external knowledge for an adversary on the risk values of the records.  
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We calculated the prosecutor risk measure for each record in the Adult sample dataset by 
considering {age, race, gender} as the QIDs. This would result in the same likelihood measure in 
our approach if we assign 𝑃𝐾 of 1 to age, race, and gender attributes, and 0 to other attributes. In 
fact, it results in having only one set of known attributes which is {age, race, gender} and one set 
of unknown attributes comprising the remaining attributes. However, in our approach, we have the 
flexibility in assigning probabilities to consider any combination of attributes to be known and 
unknown. Thus, instead of assigning probabilities 1 and 0 to attributes, which restricts an 
adversary’s external knowledge and disclosure target to only one known and unknown set, we 
changed 𝑃𝐾 of 1 to 0.99 and 𝑃𝐾 of 0 to 0.01, and calculated our likelihood measure in FADR for 
all the records. 
Table 6. Comparing prosecutor risk with our likelihood measure. 
Identity 
Disclosure Risk 
Measure 
Number of 
known/unknown 
sets 
Execution time 
(sec) 
Average Identity 
Disclosure Risk Value 
Prosecutor Risk 1 0.28 1% 
Likelihood 
Measure in FADR 
45 3.41 2% 
 
Table 6 shows that changing the probabilities from 1 and 0 to 0.99 and 0.01 respectively, increased 
the number of known and unknown sets to 45 and the execution time is increased accordingly. 
Considering 45 known and unknown sets doubled the average identity disclosure risk. Therefore, 
generalizing the external knowledge and disclosure target of an adversary, incurs higher disclosure 
risk.   
3.3.3 Evaluating our pruning algorithm 
In this experiment, we evaluate the effect of pruning threshold (𝜀) on the total FADR, the number 
of known/unknown sets remained after pruning, and the execution time, shown in Table 7.   
Figure 7 (a) shows that reducing the pruning threshold increases the number of remaining 
known/unknown sets because more sets will have the 𝑊𝑅_𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 value of Eq. (13) larger than the 
small threshold. Since the number of sets increased, the execution time for calculating FADR 
measure will also be increased, as shown in Figure 7 (b), because there are more sets to count in 
the measure.  
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Table 7. Effect of pruning threshold on FADR, number of remaining sets, and execution time. 
Pruning Threshold 
(𝜺) 
Total FADR 
 
Number of 
known/unknown 
sets 
Execution time 
(sec) 
0.0001 73,656.23 307 54.08 
0.0005 73,620.73 250 49.67 
0.001 73,569.47 225 40.09 
0.005 73,255.3 167 31.28 
0.01 72,917.68 148 26.36 
0.05 71,240.02 101 18.17 
0.1 69,358.27 81 14.69 
0.2 66,350.64 67 11.55 
0.999 52,968.05 34 6.53 
5 32,639.34 14 3.25 
10 14,769.63 7 1.75 
30 10,419.69 3 1 
60 436.43 1 0.43 
 
Figure 7 (c) shows that large thresholds result in lower total risk because we remove the 
known/unknown sets, which have high contribution in FADR measure. However, this figure 
shows that at some point (𝜺 = 0.01 in this experiment), reducing the threshold does not change 
the total FADR. This proves that at this point, the pruning algorithm is removing the 
known/unknown sets with the low contribution in the risk measure. Besides, checking this point 
(𝜀 = 0.01) in Figure 7 (a) and (b), we can see that the number of remaining known/unknown sets 
and execution time are still less than those of lower thresholds.  Thus, it is concluded that the 
best pruning threshold to choose would be the one that reaches a total FADR value, which will 
no longer be increased by reducing the threshold whereas it results in lower number of remaining 
sets and execution time compared to the lower thresholds. 
3.3.4 Effect of Publicly Known Probabilities 
FADR is calculated based on the set of parameters assigned by the data publisher. One set of 
parameters is the publicly known probabilities. In this experiment, we first evaluate the effect of 
small changes in publicly known probabilities on the total FADR, and then illustrate how the total 
FADR changes if the data publisher assigns different values of probabilities.  
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(c) 
Figure 7. Effect of pruning threshold on (a) sum of records’ FADR values (b) number of 
known/unknown sets remained, (c) execution time. 
 
First, we apply small changes to each attribute’s publicly known probability to evaluate the 
robustness of FADR measure to small changes in input parameters. Since this parameter is 
probability, we consider 1% as a small change, and increased each attribute’s probability shown 
in Table 5 by 1%, one at a time, keeping the remaining probabilities and sensitivity weights 
constant. For each trial, we applied pruning algorithm with the same threshold of 0.01, and 
calculated FADR measure. The results are shown in Table 8. It is indicated that by increasing 
probabilities by 1%, the total FADR varies between 72,591.83 and 74,892.77. Figure 8 shows that 
the small changes of probabilities does not affect the total FADR value considerably. The highest 
change in total FADR occurs when the probability of attribute Age is increased because the age of 
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individuals in the dataset has more diversity (74 different ages) and if this information is known 
for a victim, fewer candidates can be matched with the same age for the victim, and therefore the 
risk of disclosure will be increased.    
 
Table 8. Effect of small changes on publicly known probabilities. 
Trials Total FADR 
No changes 72,917.68 
𝑷𝑲(𝑨𝒈𝒆)+0.01 74,892.77 
𝑷𝑲(𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔)+0.01 73,661.57 
𝑷𝑲(𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)+0.01 74,656.47 
𝑷𝑲(𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒔)+0.01 73,803.14 
𝑷𝑲(𝑶𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)+0.01 73,632.01 
𝑷𝑲(𝑹𝒂𝒄𝒆)+0.01 73,332.08 
𝑷𝑲(𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓)+0.01 73,191.58 
𝑷𝑲(𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚)+0.01 74,186.3 
𝑷𝑲(𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆)+0.01 72,591.83 
 
 
Figure 8. Comparing the total FADR values after applying small changes on probabilities. 
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In addition, we evaluated how the total FADR value of our dataset changes if the data publisher 
assigns different values of publicly known probabilities to attributes. For this experiment, we chose 
Age and Income attributes, as two representatives of insensitive and sensitive attributes, 
respectively.     
The blue chart in Figure 9 shows that increasing publicly known probability of the Age attribute 
from zero to one, monotonically increases the total FADR, from 13,704 to 212,635. Comparing 
the trials, it is indicated that 10% increase in knowing the age of underlying individuals leads to 
the significant increase in the total FADR. Assigning higher probability to the Age attribute makes 
this attribute to be classified in the known set better than the unknown set after pruning. Since Age 
is not categorized as a sensitive attribute (SW=0), existing in the unknown set does not increase 
the consequence and thereby disclosure risk. Besides, since the underlying individuals have 
diverse age values, the frequency values of Age attribute become lower, which increases the 
likelihood of sets including Age as the known attribute. As a result, the more the Age attribute 
would be publicly known for the underlying individuals, the more disclosure risk occurs. 
 
 
Figure 9. Comparing the total FADR values after assigning different publicly known 
probabilities to Age and Income attributes. 
 
The orange chart in Figure 9 shows the same trials on the attribute Income. It shows the reverse 
trend as we increase the publicly known probability compared to the Age attribute. Increasing the 
probability from zero to one, monotonically decreases the total FADR from 72,977 to 48,788. 
Since the income level of individuals is set to be a sensitive information (SW=100), the more it 
appears in the unknown sets, the greater consequence occurs and the higher disclosure risk incurs. 
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By increasing the publicly known probability for this attribute, we classify it to more known sets 
than unknown sets, after pruning. Therefore, the total FADR is reduced.      
3.3.5 Effect of Sensitivity Weights 
In this experiment, first, we evaluate the robustness of FADR measure in small changes of the 
sensitivity weights. Then, we demonstrate how the total FADR value changes if the data publisher 
assigns different values of sensitivity weights.   
As shown in Table 5, we initially assigned attribute sensitivity weight of 100 to Work class, 
Education, Occupation, and Income attributes, while the rest of attributes are classified as 
insensitive (SW=0). In this experiment, we applied small changes to both attribute and value 
sensitivity weights of the four sensitive attributes, one at a time, keeping the remaining parameters 
constant. Since we defined the attribute sensitivity weights must be between 0 and 100, small 
change of 1% requires the attribute sensitivity weights to be changed from 100 to 99 (1 unit 
reduction). In addition, we set the value sensitivity weights to be between 0 and 1. Therefore, as a 
small change of 1%, we subtracted 0.01 from the value sensitivity weights of the four attributes, 
except for the values other than “primary school” for Education, which we added 0.01 because 
their initial sensitivity weights were zero and we cannot assign value below zero as a weight. 
Table 9. Effect of Small Changes on Sensitivity Weights. 
Trials 
Total 
FADR 
No changes 72,917.68 
𝑺𝑾(𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔)-1 72,887.44 
𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒌 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔]) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 72,617.62 
𝑺𝑾(𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)-1 72,903.95 
𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏] = 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 
𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏] = 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒖𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒚 𝒔𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍) + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 
73,147.03 
𝑺𝑾(𝑶𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)-1 72,605.54 
𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑶𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒑𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏]) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 72,605.54 
𝑺𝑾(𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆)-1 72,544.6 
𝑺𝑾(𝒓[𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆]) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 72,544.6 
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The calculated total FADR values obtained in each trial of applying such small changes are shown 
in Table 9. It is illustrated that small changes on the sensitivity weights applied trivial changes on 
the total FADR value of our dataset (from 72,544 to 73,147.03), which proves the robustness of 
the FADR measure. We can see that the total FADR value remains the same when the sensitivity 
weight of Occupation reduced by 1 and the sensitivity weight of their values reduced by 0.01 
(equals 72,605.54). The reason is that in the former case, the sensitivity weight for attribute and 
all the values are 99 and 1, respectively, and in the latter case, they are 100 and 0.99, respectively. 
In both trials, the product of such weights remains the same, and thereby it has the same 
contribution in FADR measure, which leads to the same total FADR values. The same reason 
applies to the two trails on Income.   
 
Figure 10. Comparing the total FADR values after assigning different sensitivity weights to Race 
and Income attributes.  
In addition, we demonstrated the changes on the total FADR value when the data publisher assigns 
different values of sensitivity weights to attributes and attribute’s values. Figure 12 shows the total 
FADR values achieved after assigning different values of attribute sensitivity weight to Race and 
Income. In both trials, we assigned value sensitivity weights of 1 to all races and income levels, 
and the rest of the parameters remain the same as shown in Table 5. It is illustrated that changing 
the sensitivity weight of Income attribute from 0 to 100, incus a larger increase in the total FADR 
(from 35,538 to 72,917) compared to the Race attribute (from 72,917 to 82,907). The reason is 
that according to Table 5, publicly known probability of Income attribute is much less than the 
Race attribute. Therefore, after pruning, Income appears more in the unknown sets than the known 
sets while Race exists in more known sets. Thus, Income has higher contribution in the 
consequence part of the FADR measure compared to the Race. As a result, sensitivity weight of 
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Income is more engaged in the FADR measurement than that of Race, which results in larger 
increase in total FADR when we change Income’s attribute sensitivity weight. 
Figure 11 illustrates the changes in the total FADR, when data publisher changes the sensitivity 
weights assigned to attribute values of Occupation attribute.  It is indicated that when we increase 
the sensitivity weight of all the values of Occupation from 0 to 1, the total FADR enhanced from 
41,704 to 72,917. 
 
 
Figure 11. Comparing the total FADR values after assigning different sensitivity weights to all 
values of Occupation attribute. 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we developed Flexible Adversary Disclosure Risk (FADR) measure, which 
captures both identity and attribute disclosure attacks concurrently. Besides, it models all possible 
external knowledge and disclosure targets for an adversary by considering any combination of 
attributes to be known and unknwon by an adversary. We proved that the likelihood term in FADR 
measure is a generalized form of the prosecutor risk for measuring the identity disclosure risk, 
which overcomes the limitation of the prosecutor risk measure in restricting adversary’s external 
knowledge. Our approach also provides the flexibility to data publisher to assign publicly known 
probabilties and sensitivity weights to attributes to make known sets containing more probable 
attributes and unknown sets containnig more sensitive attributes have higher contribution in FADR 
calculation. Moreover, we developed a pruning algorithm to remove known/unknown sets having 
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very low contribution in the calcultaion of FADR measure, to reduce the computation complexity 
of our measure. Finally, through a set of experiments we showed the effectiveness of our pruning 
algorithm and the robustness of FADR measure to the small changes on the input parameters.  
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4 OPTIMIZING ANONYMIZATION    
There is always a trade-off between preserving privacy and data utility, i.e., the more we 
anonymize the data to better preserve individual’s privacy, the more information the data loses and 
the less data utility it preserves. As described in Chapter 2, various privacy techniques are 
developed in the literature to satisfy a privacy model by employing anonymization techniques 
through different algorithms based on data utility objectives. Such algorithms aim at both 
satisfying a privacy requirement and minimizing information loss. A privacy requirement is a 
Boolean condition that defines specific level of privacy preservation on a sensitive dataset.   
In this chapter, we aim at developing an anonymization algorithm, which instead of achieving a 
predefined privacy level, minimizes the disclosure risk of a dataset, along with the information 
loss. Our anonymization algorithm, named “RU Generalization”, is a risk/utility-based 
generalization algorithm that utilizes our developed FADR measure, described in Chapter 3, as a 
disclosure risk measure, and Loss measure [49, 50] (re-formulated as NCP [50]), as an information 
loss metric. We use local recoding generalization as the anonymization operation.      
4.1 Data Utility Metric 
In RU Generalization algorithm, we need a metric for measuring data utility to optimize 
anonymization with respect to preserving the most data utility as well as privacy. We have chosen 
Loss as the data utility metric to measure information loss on the generalized dataset. In the 
literature, Loss has been demonstrated as an effective measure of information loss on a generalized 
dataset, since it considers the generalization level of each value [39]. It defines information loss 
based on the magnitude of deviation of the generalized value from the original value, and penalizes 
more generalized values. Loss is defined at the attribute level, as shown in Eq. (14, and can be 
aggregated at the record (Eq.(15)) and dataset level (Eq. (16)).  
 
 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴(𝑟) = {
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟[𝐴]
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴
                                                                        , 𝐴 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑟[𝐴] 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴′𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 hierarchy 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴
, 𝐴 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙
  (14) 
 
Loss of an attribute’s generalized value is calculated based on Eq. (14. If an attribute is numeric, 
Loss is derived by dividing the range of generalized value by the overall range of attribute’s 
original values. For example, if the generalized value is [10-20] and the overall range of values is 
[0-50], the Loss of the generalized value equals 10/50. If an attribute is categorical, the 
generalization hierarchy tree of the attribute is considered, and the Loss is derived by dividing the 
number of leaves at the subtree of the generalized value in the generalization hierarchy tree by the 
number of distinct original values of the attribute. For instance, Figure 12 shows an example of 
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the generalization hierarchy tree for the attribute Employment Type. Loss of the generalized value 
Government equals 3/8 because the subtree at the node Government has 3 leaves and the attribute 
has 8 total distinct original values. Loss of an attribute is a value between 0 and 1. Loss of 1 for an 
attribute means the attribute value is suppressed.    
             
 
Figure 12. Generalization hierarchy tree for the attribute "Employment Type" 
Once the Loss for the attributes are calculated, the Loss of a record is derived by the weighted sum 
of Loss of the record’s attributes, as shown in Eq.(15), and is called the record’s weighted Loss.    
  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑟) =
∑ 𝑈𝑊𝑖  ×  𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑖(𝑟)𝑖
∑ 𝑈𝑊𝑖𝑖
  (15) 
 
Based on the domain area of the data use, different attributes can be at different levels of 
importance for the purpose of study. Some attributes might be of more importance for the use of 
users and therefore the users prefer to have the original values of such attributes. Therefore, the 
Loss of such attributes needs to be weighted over other attributes with lower importance, in 
aggregating the Loss for a record. The importance weight of each attribute is denoted as UW 
(Utility Weight) in Eq.(15).  
 
 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝐷′) = ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑟)
𝑛
   (16) 
 
Finally, the Loss of the generalized dataset is the sum of all the records’ weighted Loss, as shown 
in Eq. (16), and implies the total information loss of the generalized dataset 𝐷′.  
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4.2 RU Generalization Algorithm 
Our developed RU Generalization algorithm is a greedy heuristic algorithm to obtain an optimum 
generalized dataset with the minimum disclosure risk and information loss, shown in Algorithm 
2. At each iteration, our greedy algorithm targets a record with maximum disclosure risk and the 
corresponding set of attributes contributing the most in the risk measure. Then, it aims at 
generalizing such attributes by grouping with tuples that incurs the lowest information loss. After 
applying the generalization at each iteration, the FADR measure needs to be calculated to indicate 
the reduction in risk and identify the new record at the highest disclosure risk for the next iteration. 
FADR calculation requires the updated frequency counts on all the known sets of attributes. Since 
the data is generalized, such frequency counts are not merely capturing the exact matches. They 
also count the tuples that are within the generalized value. Therefore, recalculating the FADR 
measure at each iteration is computationally expensive. Thus, our heuristic algorithm estimates the 
FADR measure, at each iteration, by only updating frequency counts of the known sets 
contributing the most in FADR calculation of the records. Besides, the known sets that have tuples 
with high frequency counts are not updated, since increasing the large frequencies have small 
impact on the FADR reduction.            
The inputs of RU Generalization algorithm include original dataset with 𝑛 records (D), list of all 
known sets (KS), publicly known probabilities for all known/unknown sets (PK), likelihood and 
consequence of all records in the dataset for all known/unknown sets (L and C, respectively), 
FADR values for all the records on the original dataset (R), the list of generalization hierarchy 
trees for all categorical attributes in the dataset (GH), utility weights of attributes (UW), and the 
user defined maximum information loss (MaxTotalLoss). This algorithm outputs a generalized 
dataset that is optimum in terms of incurring the minimum summation of disclosure risk and 
information loss.   
Our RU Generalization algorithm starts with initializing some variables (Algorithm 2, line 1-7). 
This algorithm applies generalization to the dataset at each iteration, and saves the generalized 
dataset as 𝐷′, which is initially equal to the original dataset. 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is the total risk on the 
original dataset, which is the maximum total risk compared to the total risk of the generalized 
versions of the dataset, and is used to normalize total estimated risk. At each iteration, we estimate 
the records’ disclosure risk. Therefore, we define the parameter 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 for saving the estimated 
FADR values for all the records, and initialize it to the original risk values. The total risk of the 
original dataset is the highest value compared to the total estimated risk values derived after 
generalizing the dataset. We normalize the total risk value to be between 0 and 1. Therefore, the 
initial total risk would be 1. The initial total Loss is 0, since we start with the original dataset with 
no information loss. 𝐷𝐾𝑆 contains subsets of the original dataset for each set of known set 
attributes. 𝐹𝑇 is a matrix with rows for each record and columns for each known set and contains 
the frequency of known set tuples of records in the original dataset. Since our algorithm iteratively 
searches for the matches of known set tuples in the dataset, we create an index structure to store 
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the unique known set tuples for each known set as the search keys with the indices of matching 
records in the original dataset as the reference (Algorithm 2, line 5). This index table initially 
consists of the original tuples, and will be updated to contain generalized tuples with the indices 
for the matching original records at each iteration of generalization (Algorithm 5, line 22). The 
defined objective function is the summation of the data’s total risk and total information loss 
(Algorithm 2, line 6).   
Our optimization algorithm aims at minimizing our objective function. We iteratively generalize 
the dataset (Algorithm 2, line 8-29) and calculate the total estimated risk (Algorithm 2, line 17) 
and information loss (Algorithm 2, line 19) of the generalized dataset at each iteration and derive 
the objective function and append it to the previous ones (Algorithm 2, line 20).   
At each iteration, we find the minimum of the objective function (Algorithm 2, line 21) and 
compare it to the global minimum obtained from the previous iterations (Algorithm 2, line 22). If 
the minimum value obtained in the current iteration is less than the global minimum from the 
previous iterations, it implies that the generalized dataset created in the current iteration has lower 
disclosure risk and information loss compared to the previous ones. Therefore, we save that as the 
optimum generalized dataset obtained so far (Algorithm 2, line 23), and update the global 
minimum point with the minimum value obtained in the current iteration (Algorithm 2, line 24). 
Our algorithm continues until we know that the objective function will not go below the global 
minimum. As we further generalize the dataset, the total information loss always increases while 
the total risk decreases monotonically. Thus, if the total information loss gets larger than the global 
minimum of the objective function, it is concluded that, by further generalizing the dataset, our 
objective function will not go below the global minimum. As a result, our algorithm continues as 
long as the total information loss is less than or equal to the global minimum value of the objective 
function (Algorithm 2, line 8). When the total information loss gets larger than the global minimum 
value (Algorithm 2, line 26), the algorithm will not execute the next iteration and the generalized 
dataset which was obtained at the point of global minimum of the objective function is returned as 
the optimum generalized dataset (Algorithm 2, line 27). 
At each iteration of our algorithm, we find a record in the dataset with the highest estimated risk 
value (Algorithm 2, line 9) and the corresponding known set of attributes that contributes the most 
in the risk calculation (Algorithm 2, line 10). A set of attribute values contributing the most in the 
risk calculation for the highest risk record is saved as t1 (Algorithm 2, line 11). By scanning all 
sets of values for the same attributes in the dataset, we find tuples (save as t2) which incur low 
information loss if we group them with t1 and generalize their attributes to have the same values 
(Algorithm 2, line 12). “Low Loss Tuples” is an algorithm we developed for finding such tuples, 
which is shown in Algorithm 4, and will be described in Section 4.2.1. 
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Algorithm 2. RU Generalization  
Input: 𝐷 = {𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛}, 𝐾𝑆 = {𝐾𝑆1, 𝐾𝑆2, … , 𝐾𝑆𝑚}, 𝑃𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐶, 𝑅, 𝐺𝐻, 𝑈𝑊, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 
Output: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 
Algorithm: 
1: 𝐷′ = 𝐷; 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = sum (𝑅); 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑅 ; 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 1;  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝐶𝑃 = 0;  
2: 𝐿𝐶 = matrix of 𝐿 × 𝐶 for all sets (each corresponds to one column) and all records (each 
corresponds to one row); 
3: 𝐷𝐾𝑆 = subsets of 𝐷 for all known sets in 𝐾𝑆; 
4: 𝐹𝑇 = matrix of frequency of the known set tuples of all the records in 𝐷 (number of rows = 
𝑛, number of columns = number of known sets in 𝐾𝑆); 
5: 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = for each known set, unique set of known set attribute values of 𝐷 as the 
search keys along with the record’s indices matching the tuple as the references; 
6: 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑛 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 +  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝐶𝑃; 
7: 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛 = 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑛; 
8: while (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛) do 
9:  ℎ𝑟 = record with maximum value in 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘; 
10:  𝐴 = set of attributes in 𝐾𝑆[argmax
𝑖
 (𝐿[ℎ𝑟, ] × 𝐶[ℎ𝑟, ])]; 
11:  𝑡1 = ℎ𝑟[𝐴] in 𝐷′; 
12:  𝑡2 = Low Loss Tuples(𝑡1, 𝐴, 𝐷, 𝐷′, 𝐺𝐻, 𝑈𝑊);    
13:  𝐺𝐴 = set of attributes having different values in 𝑡1 and 𝑡2; 
14:  𝑔𝑟 = group of records in 𝐷′ containing 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 for 𝐴; 
15:  𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟 = Generalize (𝑔𝑟, 𝐺𝐴, 𝐺𝐻);  
16:  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝐹𝑇, 𝐿, 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = FADR Estimate(𝐹𝑇, 𝐺𝐴, 𝐾𝑆, 𝐷𝐾𝑆, 𝑔𝑟, 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟, 
 𝐺𝐻, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝐾, 𝐶); 
17:  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) / MaxTotal𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘; 
18:  𝐷′ = replace 𝑔𝑟 records in 𝐷′ with 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟;  
19:  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = sum of Loss of all attributes on the generalized records, calculated from  
 Eq. (14)/𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠; 
20:  Append (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 +  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) to 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑛; 
21:  𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑛 = min (𝑂𝑏𝑗𝐹𝑢𝑛); 
22:  if 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑛 < 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛 then 
23:   𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝐷′; 
24:   𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛 = 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑛; 
25:  end if 
26:  if 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 > 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑛 then 
27:   Output 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎; 
28:  end if 
29: end while  
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Among the attributes in t1 and t2, the ones that have different values are going to be generalized 
and are saved as GA (Algorithm 2, line 13). Group of records in the dataset that contain t1 and t2 
are saved as gr (Algorithm 2, line 14), and are generalized through “Generalize” algorithm. The 
generalized group is saved as GENgr (Algorithm 2, line 15). Algorithm 3 shows the generalization 
algorithm. It goes over the generalized attributes of the group. If the attribute is numeric, it 
generalizes the group attribute values to be the range of values in the group (Algorithm 3, line 3). 
For instance, if attribute values of the records in the group are 63,65, and 66, then the generalized 
value will be 63-66. It is possible that some records in the group have already been generalized 
from previous iterations. For example, the group records can be 62-64, 65, and 66. Then, the 
generalized value will be 62-66. If the attribute is categorical, we refer to the generalization 
hierarchy tree of the attribute, and the generalized value will be the lowest common ancestor of 
the values of the records in the group (Algorithm 3, line 5). 
When we obtain the new generalized group (GENgr), we need to estimate the disclosure risk that 
incurs on the dataset with the new generalized group. The new FADR values for the original 
records based on the generalized dataset is estimated through “FADR Estimate” algorithm, shown 
in Algorithm 5, which will be explained in Section 4.2.2. Then, we calculate the total normalized 
FADR value of the generalized dataset, by dividing the summation of records’ estimated FADR 
values by the maximum total risk, which is the total risk of the original dataset (Algorithm 2, line 
17). 
Algorithm 3. Generalize 
Input: 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑒 
Output: 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 
Algorithm: 
1: for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 in 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟  
2:  if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 is numeric then   
3:   𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] = concatenate min(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]) and “-” and 
   max(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]);      
4:  else  
5:   𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]  = lowest common ancestor of 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] values 
   in 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑒 associated with 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟; 
6:  end if 
7: end for 
8: Output 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠; 
 
Afterwards, we update the records that have been selected for generalization with the generalized 
values in the dataset (Algorithm 2, line 18). Having the new generalized dataset, we calculate the 
total information loss, by adding the Loss of all the generalized attributes in 𝐷′, based on Eq. (16). 
Similar to normalizing the total risk, we need to normalize the total information loss. However, 
the maximum information loss (𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) is a parameter that can be defined by data 
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publisher (Algorithm 2, line 19). Therefore, it is possible that the total information loss of a 
generalized dataset exceeds the defined maximum total Loss, which leads to normalized total Loss 
value of more than one. Based on Eq.(14, the maximum Loss of an attribute is 1, which happens 
when the attribute value is suppressed. For instance, if the data publisher sets 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 to 
be equal to n (number of records in the dataset), a generalized dataset with n suppressed values is 
considered to have maximum information loss.   
Algorithm 4. Low Loss Tuples 
Input: 𝑡1, 𝐴, 𝐷, 𝐷′, 𝐺𝐻, 𝑈𝑊 
Output: 𝑡2 
Algorithm: 
1: Initialize 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 as an empty vector of size n;  
2: for each 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑 in 𝐷′ 
3:  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 0; 
4:  for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 in 𝐴 
5:   𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 = 𝐺𝐻 associated with 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟; 
6:   if 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 is numeric then   
7:    𝑔𝑀𝑖𝑛 = min(𝑡1[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟], 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]); 
8:    𝑔𝑀𝑎𝑥 = max(𝑡1[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟], 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]); 
9:    𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = (𝑔𝑀𝑎𝑥 − 𝑔𝑀𝑖𝑛) 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝐷[, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟])⁄  ; 
10:   else  
11:    𝑔 = lowest common ancestor of 𝑡1[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] and 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] in 𝐺𝐻  
   associated with 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟; 
12:    𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠=leaf counts of subtree at 𝑔 in 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 leaf counts in 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒⁄  ; 
13:   end if 
14:   𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠+ (𝑈𝑊[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]  × 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠); 
15:  end for 
16:  𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠/𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑈𝑊[𝐴]) 
17:  Append 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 to 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠; 
18: end for 
19: if min (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) ≤ 0.1 then  
20:  𝑡2 = 𝐷′[(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 0.1), ]; 
21: else if min (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) ≤ 0.2 then 
22:  𝑡2 = 𝐷′[(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 0.2), ]; 
23: … 
24: else  
25:  𝑡2 = 𝐷′[(𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ≤ 1), ]; 
26: end if  
27: Output 𝑡2; 
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4.2.1 Finding Tuples with Low Loss 
At each iteration of the RU Generalization algorithm, we calculate the Loss measure of records in 
𝐷′ when they are grouped and generalized with t1. Then, the records which incur the lowest 
information loss after generalization are selected. This procedure is indicated in Algorithm 4. We 
first calculate the Loss of each attribute in A, based on Eq. (16). If the attribute is numeric, the 
minimum and maximum values of t1 and 𝐷′ attribute values are considered as the range in the 
numerator of the equation, and the range of attribute values in the original dataset (D) is counted 
in the denominator (Algorithm 4, line 7-9). If the attribute is categorical, the lowest common 
ancestor of t1 and 𝐷′ attribute values in the generalization hierarchy tree is considered as the 
generalized value, and the number of leaves at the subtree of the generalized value in counted in 
the numerator of the Loss formula (Algorithm 4, line 11-12). 
Having the Loss of attributes in A calculated for all the records in 𝐷′, we then calculate the 
weighted Loss for each record, by considering attributes’ utility weights that are defined by the 
user, based on the Eq.(15) (Algorithm 4, line 16). We append the Loss of all the records in a vector 
(Algorithm 4, line 17), and records with low Loss (less than 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, etc. based on the values 
exist) are chosen as t2 (Algorithm 4, line 19-26) to be grouped and generalized with t1. 
4.2.2 FADR Estimate  
At each iteration of RU Generalization algorithm, after creating a new generalized group, we need 
the new FADR values of the records and the total FADR of the dataset. We consider different 
adversaries who know different sets of attributes (known sets) about all the individuals in the 
original dataset. By generalizing some records, the number of candidates matching an original 
record increases. Therefore, the disclosure risk decreases. Back to the FADR measure defined in 
Chapter 3, the inverse frequency term in Eq. (7) decreases at each iteration of generalization.  
In order to enhance the efficiency of our RU Generalization algorithm, we estimate the records’ 
FADR value at each iteration, instead of calculating the exact values. Algorithm 5 shows the steps 
to estimate the FADR value of the records at each iteration of the RU Generalization algorithm. 
By considering the new generalized group at each iteration, the algorithm searches for the original 
records that are matched in the generalized group, and increase the frequency of such records. The 
estimation is considered by not updating the tuple frequencies of all the known sets. We only 
update the known sets contributing the most in the FADR calculation (Algorithm 5, line 3), as well 
as the known sets having tuple frequencies of low values. The latter means that the algorithm skips 
updating frequencies of the known sets with all tuple frequencies more than ε, because changes on 
the large frequencies have small impact on changing the FADR value (Algorithm 5, line 9-11). 
For FADR estimation, since we do not increase the frequency of some known sets, the total 
estimated FADR value is larger than the true value. Therefore, we over-estimate the total FADR 
value.      
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Algorithm 5. FADR Estimate 
Input: 𝐹𝑇, 𝐺𝐴, 𝐾𝑆, 𝐿𝐶, 𝐷𝐾𝑆, 𝑔𝑟, 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟, 𝐺𝐻, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝐾, 𝐶 
Output: Updated 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, Updated 𝐹𝑇, Updated Likelihood, Estimated FADR 
1: 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐹𝑇 = 𝐹𝑇; 
2: 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐾𝑆 = known sets in 𝐾𝑆 containing any attributes of 𝐺𝐴; 
3: 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠 = known/unknown sets having max 𝐿𝐶 for records; 
4: 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 = intersection of 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐾𝑆 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠; 
5: 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 = 𝐷𝐾𝑆[𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆]; 
6: 𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠 = subsets of 𝑔𝑟 for all known sets in 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆; 
7: 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠 = subsets of 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟 for all known sets in 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆; 
8: for each 𝑖 in 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 
9:  if all values in 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐹𝑇[𝑖] > ε then 
10:   Next; 
11:  end if 
12:  𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = empty vector; 
13:  for each unique 𝑡 in 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠[𝑖] 
14:   𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = 1:number of rows in 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆[𝑖]; 
15:   for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 in 𝑡 
16:    if 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] is already generalized then 
17:     𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = MatchGeneralizedGroup(𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟, 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟],   
    𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆[𝑖][𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟], 𝐺𝐻); 
18:    else  
19:     𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = index of 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆[𝑖][𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] matching 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]; 
20:    end if    
21:   end for 
22:   Append 𝑡 in 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒[𝑖] as a new search key with 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 as a reference; 
23:   𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = replicate 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 by the number of times 𝑡 appears in 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠[𝑖]; 
24:   𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 union 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥;  
25:  end for 
26:  𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = references of tuples in 𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠[𝑖] found in 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒[𝑖]; 
27:  𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = exclude 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 from 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠; 
28:  𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑇 = frequency table of 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠; 
29:  Add frequency values in 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑇 to 𝐹𝑇[, 𝑖] for the matched indices;  
30: end for 
31: Output updated 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒; Output updated 𝐹𝑇; 
32: 𝐿 = 𝑃𝐾 ×
1
𝐹𝑇
 , for each record and each known set; 
33: Output 𝐿; 
34: 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖 ×  𝐶𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐾𝑆)
𝑖=1  ; 
35: Output 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘; 
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In Algorithm 2, we initialized 𝐹𝑇 as the frequency table for all the records and all the known sets 
(Algorithm 2, line 4). In Algorithm 5, such frequencies are updated based on the new generalized 
group. The tuple frequencies of the known sets that contain the generalized attributes will only be 
updated (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐾𝑆). In addition, to enhance the efficiency of our algorithm, we only update the 
frequency of known sets contributing the most in records’ FADR values, i.e., having maximum 
value in 𝐿𝐶 matrix for the records (𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠). Therefore, the algorithm only updates the sets 
appear in both 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐾𝑆 and 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, i.e., 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 (Algorithm 5, line 4).      
We also save the set of attribute values of 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 in the original dataset as 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆, and 
the records of the new generalized group, before and after generalization, as 𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠 and 
𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, respectively (Algorithm 5, line 5-7). For each known set in 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆, we look at 
each unique tuple of 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, to find the original records in the corresponding 𝐷_𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑆 
that match the generalized tuple. For attributes in the tuple that are not generalized, we just check 
which original records have the exact same values (Algorithm 5, line 19). For attributes in the tuple 
that are generalized, we need to see which original records have values that are embedded in the 
generalized value (Algorithm 5, line 17). This step is further explained in “Match Generalized 
Value” algorithm, shown in Algorithm 6.     
Algorithm 6 indicates that if the checking attribute is numeric, it splits the generalized value into 
two numbers of minimum and maximum of the generalized range, and outputs the index of original 
records having numbers between the obtained minimum and maximum values (Algorithm 6, line 
2-3). If the checking attribute is categorical, in the corresponding generalization hierarchy tree, it 
finds the leaf nodes at the subtree of the generalized value, and outputs the index of original records 
with attribute values that exist among the leaf nodes (Algorithm 6, line 5).   
Algorithm 6. Match Generalized Value   
Input:  
𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒, 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠, 𝐺𝐻 
Output: 
index of 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 which are embedded in the 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
Algorithm: 
1. if 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 is numeric then   
2.  𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥 = split 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 on “-”;   
3.  𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 = range of 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑥 
4. else  
5.  𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 = all the leaf nodes of the subtree at 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 in 𝐺𝐻 of 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟; 
6. end if 
7. Output index of 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 which are included in 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠; 
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Back to our “FADR Estimate” algorithm, once the matching original records found for a specific 
generalized tuple, the generalized tuple with the indices of the original matched records are 
appended to the 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 for the underlying known set (Algorithm 5, line 22). If the tuple 
appears more than once in 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, the indices of matching original records are duplicated by 
the number of times the tuple exists (Algorithm 5, line 23). Finally, after looking over all the tuples 
in 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, we find all the original records (with duplicates) that match the new generalized 
group (Algorithm 5, line 8-25). However, some of the found original matching records are the 
records that are already matched with the tuples before generalization. Therefore, such matches 
are already counted in 𝐹𝑇 from previous iterations. Thus, we need to exclude such record indices 
from the found pool (Algorithm 5, line 27). Such record indices are stored in the 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
from previous iterations, as the references to the tuples in 𝑔𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑠, which are the tuples before 
generalization (Algorithm 5, line 26). 
Once we found all the records’ indices that are newly matched in the new generalized group, we 
create a frequency table for such indices to see how many times each original record is matched in 
the new generalized group besides the previous matches (Algorithm 5, line 28). Then, we add such 
frequencies in the 𝐹𝑇 for the corresponding records and known sets (Algorithm 5, line 29). Since 
the 𝐹𝑇 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 are both updated in this algorithm, and will be used in the next 
iterations, this algorithm outputs the updated 𝐹𝑇 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (Algorithm 5, line 31). 
After updating 𝐹𝑇, we calculate and output the likelihood and FADR measure for all the original 
records (Algorithm 5, line 32-35).    
Table 10. Sample adult dataset 
 Age Education Employment Type 
𝒓𝟏 39 Bachelors State-gov 
𝒓𝟐 25 HS-grad Self-emp-not-inc 
𝒓𝟑 56 Bachelors Local-gov 
𝒓𝟒 22 Some-college State-gov 
𝒓𝟓 53 Bachelors Self-emp-not-inc 
𝒓𝟔 49 HS-grad Local-gov 
𝒓𝟕 67 HS-grad Without-pay 
𝒓𝟖 24 1st-4th Private 
𝒓𝟗 23 1st-4th Private 
𝒓𝟏𝟎 66 5th-6th Private 
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4.3 Illustrative Example  
In this example, we illustrate the major steps of our RU Generalization algorithm. Assume a 
sample microdata, from Adult dataset, shown in Table 10, as our original dataset. At first, we 
calculate the FADR measure on the original dataset, based on assigned parameters shown in Table 
11, and pruning threshold of 0.01. After applying pruning algorithm described in Chapter 1, 5 
known/unknown sets are remained, as shown in Table 12.   
The initial frequency table (FT) of all the records and all the 5 known sets is shown in Table 13. 
For instance, the second known set tuple of the first record is {State-gov} that appears 2 times in 
the dataset. The initial FADR values calculated for each record is shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 11. FADR parameters for sample adult dataset 
Attribute 
Publicly Known 
Probability 
Attribute 
Sensitivity 
Weight 
Value 
Sensitivity 
Weight 
 
 Values Weight 
Age 0.3 0 
all 
values 
0 
Employment Type 0.1 100 
Without pay 1 
Other than 
"without pay” 
0.1 
Education 
 
 
0.1 100 
Primary 
school 
1 
Other than 
"primary school” 
0 
 
Table 12. Known/unknown sets remained after pruning on the sample adult dataset 
 Known Sets Unknown Sets 
1 {age} {education, employment type } 
2 {employment type} {age, education} 
3 {age, employment type } {education} 
4 {education} {age, employment type } 
5 {age, education} { employment type } 
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Table 13. Original frequency table of all known set tuples of all the records 
 KS1 KS2 KS3 KS4 KS5 
𝒓𝟏 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟐 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟑 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟒 1 2 1 1 1 
𝒓𝟓 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟔 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟕 1 1 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟖 1 3 1 2 1 
𝒓𝟗 1 3 1 2 1 
𝒓𝟏𝟎 1 3 1 1 1 
 
Table 14. Initial FADR values of the records on the original dataset 
 
 
The RU Generalization algorithm, starts with the record with the highest FADR value, which is 
𝑟10 and the known/unknown set contributing the most in LC calculation, which is the first 
known/unknown set that only contains the age attribute as the known attribute. Therefore, t1 will 
be {66}, and after going through the “Low Loss Tuples” algorithm, 𝑟7 is found to be merged with 
t1 as the low loss group. Therefore, the gr is: 
 
 Age Education Employment Type 
𝒓𝟕 67 HS-grad Without-pay 
𝒓𝟏𝟎 66 5th-6th Private 
age education type_employer FADR
r1 39 Bachelors State-gov 2.91
r2 25 HS-grad Self-emp-not-inc 2.91
r3 56 Bachelors Local-gov 2.91
r4 22 Some-college State-gov 3.33
r5 53 Bachelors Self-emp-not-inc 2.91
r6 49 HS-grad Local-gov 2.91
r7 67 HS-grad Without-pay 29.1
r8 24 1st-4th Private 32.115
r9 23 1st-4th Private 32.115
r10 66 5th-6th Private 32.43
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And after applying generalization, GENgr will be: 
 
 Age Education Employment Type 
𝒓𝟕 66-67 HS-grad Without-pay 
𝒓𝟏𝟎 66-67 5th-6th Private 
 
The “FADR Estimate” algorithm goes over all the known sets containing the generalized attribute 
(Age in this example), which are KS1, KS3, and KS5.   
For KS1 ({age}), the generalized group has two same tuples of {66-67}. Checking the {age} tuples 
in the original dataset, 𝑟7 and 𝑟10 are found to be matched with this generalized tuple. Since {66-
67} appears two times in the generalized group, we double the found matched record indices: {𝑟7, 
𝑟10, 𝑟7, 𝑟10}.  
 
Table 15. IndexStructure of the first known set before generalization 
Search Key References  
39 𝑟1 
25 𝑟2 
56 𝑟3 
22 𝑟4 
53 𝑟5 
49 𝑟6 
67 𝑟7 
24 𝑟8 
23 𝑟9 
66 𝑟10 
 
In addition, we need to search the tuples of gr in the IndexStructure to find the matching records 
that are already counted in FT. IndexStructure of the first known set ({age}) is shown in Table 15. 
{66} and {67} are the first known set tuples of gr. Searching in the IndexStructure, {66} has the 
reference of 𝑟10 and {67} has the reference of 𝑟7. Therefore, {𝑟7, 𝑟10} is excluded from {𝑟7, 𝑟10, 𝑟7, 
𝑟10}, and finally {𝑟7, 𝑟10} is remained as the records that are newly affected by the generalization. 
Each of the affected records are found once, and therefore their frequencies in FT are added by 1. 
The updated FT and IndexStructure are shown in Table 16 and Table 17 , respectively.  
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Table 16. Updated frequency table after the first generalization on the first known set 
 KS1 KS2 KS3 KS4 KS5 
𝒓𝟏 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟐 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟑 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟒 1 2 1 1 1 
𝒓𝟓 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟔 1 2 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟕 1+1 = 2 1 1 3 1 
𝒓𝟖 1 3 1 2 1 
𝒓𝟗 1 3 1 2 1 
𝒓𝟏𝟎 1 +1 = 2 3 1 1 1 
 
Table 17. IndexStructure of the first known set after generalization 
Search Key References  
39 𝑟1 
25 𝑟2 
56 𝑟3 
22 𝑟4 
53 𝑟5 
49 𝑟6 
67 𝑟7 
24 𝑟8 
23 𝑟9 
66 𝑟10 
66-67 𝑟7,  𝑟10 
 
4.4 Calculating FADR Exposed by an Anonymized Dataset  
In the RU Generalization algorithm, we have over-estimated the FADR values at each iteration, 
by not updating all the known sets’ frequencies. Once a generalized dataset is obtained from the 
RU generalization algorithm, the true FADR values need to be calculated for the records in the 
generalized dataset. 
Our FADR calculation over an anonymized dataset follows the “maximum knowledge attacker 
model” [9], which considers an adversary who knows both the original and anonymized dataset 
and tries to do mapping between the two. Likewise, we start with the original dataset (𝐷), and for 
each record and known set of attributes, we find matching records in the anonymized dataset. Once 
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we find frequency of the known set tuples of original records in the anonymized dataset, we can 
compute the FADR measure by multiplying the publicly known probabilities of the sets and the 
consequence values that are already calculated. 
 
Algorithm 7. FADR Calculation 
Input:  
𝐷, 𝐷′, 𝐾𝑆, 𝑃𝐾, 𝐺𝐻, 𝐶         
Output: 
FADR 
Algorithm: 
1: 𝐷𝐾𝑆 = subsets of 𝐷 for all known sets in 𝐾𝑆; 
2: 𝐷′𝐾𝑆 = subsets of 𝐷′ for all known sets in 𝐾𝑆; 
3: 𝐹𝑇 = matrix of frequency of the known set tuples of all the records in 𝐷 (number of rows = 
𝑛, number of columns = number of known sets in 𝐾𝑆); 
4: for each 𝑖 in 𝐾𝑆 
5:  𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = empty vector; 
6:  for each unique 𝑡 in 𝐷′𝐾𝑆[𝑖] 
7:   𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = 1: 𝑛 ; 
8:   for each 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 in 𝑡 
9:    if 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] is already generalized then 
10:     𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = Match Generalized Value(𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟, 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟],   
    𝐷𝐾𝑆[𝑖][𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟], 𝐺𝐻); 
11:    else  
12:     𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = index of 𝐷𝐾𝑆[𝑖][𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟] matching 𝑡[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟]; 
13:    end if    
14:   end for 
15:   𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 = replicate 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥 by the number of times 𝑡 appears in 𝐷′𝐾𝑆[𝑖]; 
16:   𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 union 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥;  
17:  end for 
18:  𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑇 = frequency table of 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠; 
19:  𝐹𝑇[, 𝑖] = frequency values in 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑇 for the matched indices; 
20: end for 
21: 𝐿 = 𝑃𝐾 ×
1
𝐹𝑇
 , for each record and each known set; 
22: 𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖 × 𝐶𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐾𝑆)
𝑖=1  ; 
23: Output 𝐹𝐴𝐷𝑅; 
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Algorithm 7 indicates the steps to find the frequency of the known tuples of the original records in 
the generalized dataset. It is similar to Algorithm 5 (FADR Estimate), illustrated in Chapter 4, with 
the difference in the target generalized records. Since Algorithm 5 was called in each iteration of 
our RU Generalization algorithm, for the computation efficiency, we considered only the new 
generalized group to count the frequency of the matching original tuples, and we needed to exclude 
the matchings that were already counted in previous iterations. In Algorithm 7, we have the entire 
generalized dataset (𝐷′), and for each generalized record and every known set, we find matching 
original tuples, through Algorithm 6 (Match Generalized Value). For each original record and 
specific known set, the frequency table is populated with the frequency value of the corresponding 
original tuple in the generalized dataset (line 19). 𝑃𝐾 and 𝐶, are publicly known probabilities of 
the known/unknown sets and consequence values of the records for each unknown set, 
respectively. The two parameters are pre-calculated based on the defined parameters for FADR 
measure, described in Chapter 3.   
4.5 Experiments  
In this experiment, we applied our RU Generalization algorithm on the same Adult sample dataset 
used in the experiment of Chapter 3. The input parameters of our algorithm in this experiment are 
shown in Table 18. The generalization hierarchy trees used for the categorical attributes are shown 
in Table 19-26.  
 
Table 18. RU Generalization algorithm input parameter values 
RU Generalization 
Algorithm 
Input Parameter 
Value 
𝑫 
Adult sample dataset, 9 attributes and 30162 records 
(same dataset used in Chapter 3 experiment) 
𝑲𝑺, 𝑷𝑲, 𝑳, 𝑪, 𝑹 
Obtained from Chapter 3 experiment, with the FADR parameter 
values shown in Table 5 and pruning threshold of 0.01 
𝑮𝑯 Shown in Table 19-26 
𝑼𝑾 1 for all attributes 
𝑴𝒂𝒙𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝑳𝒐𝒔𝒔 2𝑛, 𝑛, and 𝑛 2⁄  
 
In this experiment, since we are not considering specific use purpose of the dataset, we assume 
that all the attributes are in the same level of importance, and assigned the utility weight of 1 for 
all the attributes. For normalizing total Loss, we tested different values of 2𝑛, 𝑛, and 𝑛 2⁄  for 
maximum total Loss parameter, to examine the output change of the algorithm. 𝑛 is the size of our 
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Adult sample dataset, which equals 30,162. The total loss of 𝑛 can be interpreted as a dataset with 
𝑛 suppressed values.  
 
Table 19. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Race" 
Level0 Level1 
White * 
Asian-Pac-Islander * 
Amer-Indian-Eskimo * 
Other * 
Black * 
 
Table 20. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Work Class" 
Level0 Level1 Level2 
Private Non-Government * 
Self-emp-not-inc Non-Government * 
Self-emp-inc Non-Government * 
Federal-gov Government * 
Local-gov Government * 
State-gov Government * 
Without-pay Unemployed * 
Never-worked Unemployed * 
 
Table 21. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Gender" 
Level0 Level1 
Male * 
Female * 
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Table 22. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Marital status" 
Level0 Level1 Level2 
Divorced Spouse not present * 
Never-married Spouse not present * 
Separated Spouse not present * 
Widowed Spouse not present * 
Married-spouse-absent Spouse not present * 
Married-civ-spouse Spouse present * 
Married-AF-spouse Spouse present * 
 
Table 23 . Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Education" 
Level0 Level1 Level2 Level3 
Bachelors Undergraduate Higher education * 
Some-college Undergraduate Higher education * 
Prof-school Professional Education Higher education * 
Assoc-acdm Professional Education Higher education * 
Assoc-voc Professional Education Higher education * 
Masters Graduate Higher education * 
Doctorate Graduate Higher education * 
1st-4th Primary School Primary education * 
5th-6th Primary School Primary education * 
Preschool Primary School Primary education * 
11th High School Secondary education * 
HS-grad High School Secondary education * 
9th High School Secondary education * 
7th-8th High School Secondary education * 
12th High School Secondary education * 
10th High School Secondary education * 
66 
 
Table 24. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Occupation" 
Level0 Level1 Level2 
Sales Nontechnical * 
Exec-managerial Nontechnical * 
Handlers-cleaners Nontechnical * 
Other-service Other * 
Adm-clerical Other * 
Farming-fishing Other * 
Transport-moving Other * 
Priv-house-serv Other * 
Protective-serv Other * 
Armed-Forces Other * 
Tech-support Technical * 
Craft-repair Technical * 
Prof-specialty Technical * 
Machine-op-inspct Technical * 
 
Table 25. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Income" 
Level0 Level1 
<=50K * 
>50K * 
 
In this experiment, we ran our RU Generalization algorithm three times, with three different values 
of maximum total Loss. Figure 13-15 show the reduction in normalized total estimated FADR and 
the increase in normalized total Loss, as our algorithm iteratively generalizes the dataset, for the 
three trials. The optimum point chosen by the algorithm is cross marked in the figures, which is 
the point of global minimum of the objective function. As described in Algorithm 2, line 26, when 
the normalized total Loss gets larger than the global minimum, the algorithm terminates. This is 
indicated in Figure 13-15, where the last point of iteration has normalized total Loss value larger 
than the marked global minimum.       
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Table 26. Generalization Hierarchy of attribute "Country" 
Level0 Level1 Level2 
South Africa * 
Cambodia Asia * 
India Asia * 
Japan Asia * 
China Asia * 
Iran Asia * 
Philippines Asia * 
Vietnam Asia * 
Laos Asia * 
Taiwan Asia * 
Thailand Asia * 
Hong Asia * 
England Europe * 
Germany Europe * 
Greece Europe * 
Italy Europe * 
Poland Europe * 
Portugal Europe * 
Ireland Europe * 
France Europe * 
Hungary Europe * 
Scotland Europe * 
Yugoslavia Europe * 
Holland-Netherlands Europe * 
United-States North America * 
Puerto-Rico North America * 
Canada North America * 
Outlying-US North America * 
Cuba North America * 
Honduras North America * 
Jamaica North America * 
Mexico North America * 
Dominican-Republic North America * 
Haiti North America * 
Guatemala North America * 
El-Salvador North America * 
Ecuador South America * 
Columbia South America * 
Nicaragua South America * 
Trinidad &Tobago South America * 
Peru South America * 
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The only difference between the three trials is the value of maximum total Loss, which only affects 
the normalized values of the total Loss at each iteration. In all the three trials, the normalized total 
estimated FADR obtained at each iteration is the same. Therefore, the blue chart line in Figure 13-
15 are all the same. The total Loss at each iteration for all the three trials are all the same as well. 
However, since the maximum total Loss is different, the normalized total Loss at each iteration is 
different in the three trials. Consequently, the objective function, which is the sum of normalized 
total FADR and normalized total Loss, has different trend in the three trials.        
Smaller value of the maximum total Loss makes the value of total loss to be normalized to a larger 
value. Thus, as shown in Figure 13-15, when the maximum total Loss decreases from 2𝑛 to 𝑛 2⁄ , 
at each iteration the value of the normalized total Loss increases. Therefore, from Figure 13 to 
Figure 15, the slop of the orange chart line increases. As a result, since the blue chart line is 
constant in the figures, the minimum point of the grey chart line, which is the sum of blue and 
orange charts, happens at the earlier iterations, when the maximum total Loss decreases from 2𝑛 
to 𝑛 2⁄ . In addition, larger values of the normalized total Loss, with the constant normalized FADR, 
lead to higher values of the objective function. Thus, from Figure 13 to Figure 15, the global 
minimum of the objective function increases.     
For the trial of the 2𝑛 maximum total Loss, Figure 13 indicates that our algorithm stopped after 
518 iterations, since the normalized total Loss (44.38%) went above the minimum point of the 
objective function (31.91%). The optimum generalized dataset is achieved at the 471st iteration, 
when the normalized estimated total disclosure risk is 22.74% (77.26% reduction) and normalized 
total information loss is 9.17% (9.17% increase). 
For the trial of the 𝑛 maximum total Loss, Figure 14 indicates that our algorithm stopped after 512 
iterations, since the normalized total Loss (51.32%) went above the minimum point of the objective 
function (40.09%). The optimum generalized dataset is achieved at the 441st iteration, when the 
normalized estimated total disclosure risk is 26.27% (73.73% reduction) and normalized total 
information loss is 13.83% (13.83% increase). For this trial, after we obtained the optimum 
generalized dataset, at the 441st iteration, we ran the Algorithm 7, to find out the true total FADR 
value. The actual normalized total FADR value of the generalized dataset derived as 18.34%, 
which is 7.93% lower than the estimated value. 
For the trial of the 𝑛 2⁄  maximum total Loss, Figure 15 indicates that our algorithm stopped after 
512 iterations, since the normalized total Loss (102.64%) went above the minimum point of the 
objective function (50.32%). As mentioned earlier, the normalized total Loss can exceed 100% 
when the total loss of a generalized dataset exceeds the user defined maximum total Loss. The 
optimum generalized dataset is achieved at the 353rd iteration, when the normalized estimated total 
disclosure risk is 34.10% (65.9% reduction) and normalized total information loss is 16.22% 
(16.22% increase).    
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Figure 13. Trend of risk and information loss over the iterations of RU Generalization algorithm, 
when MaxTotalLoss = 2n 
 
 
Figure 14. Trend of risk and information loss over the iterations of RU Generalization algorithm, 
when MaxTotalLoss = n 
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Figure 15. Trend of risk and information loss over the iterations of RU Generalization algorithm, 
when MaxTotalLoss = n/2 
 
 
Figure 16. Effect of maximum total Loss on the non-normalized values of total estimated FADR 
and total Loss at the optimum point 
    
Figure 16 shows the non-normalized values of the total estimated FADR and total Loss at the 
optimum point, in the three trials. Increasing maximum total Loss, makes the total loss values to 
be normalized to smaller values. Therefore, the information loss portion of the objective function 
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gets lower values at each iteration. As a result, our algorithm, with the higher maximum total loss 
assignment, iterates more to reach a lower objective function. Iterating more applies more 
generalization, which results in lower disclosure risk but higher information loss. 
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5 ANONYMIZED DATASET EVALUATION  
An anonymized dataset is evaluated in terms of the amount of both privacy and data utility it 
preserves. Disclosure risk measure can be used to quantify privacy preservation, and information 
loss metric is a measure of data utility. In this chapter, we evaluate the generalized dataset obtained 
from our RU Generalization algorithm, described in Chapter 4, by calculating FADR and Loss 
measures, to evaluate privacy and data utility preservation, respectively. The total Loss of a 
generalized dataset is derived by the sum of Loss of all the attributes on the generalized records, 
calculated from Eq. (14, based on the defined generalization hierarchies for the attributes. The 
FADR measure of a generalized dataset is calculated through Algorithm 7, described in Chapter 
4.    
In this chapter, we also aim at comparing our RU Generalization algorithm with the benchmark 
generalization algorithms. We use the ARX Data Anonymization Tool [51], for implementing the 
benchmark local recoding generalization on Adult dataset, with average re-identification risk 
privacy model, to obtain different generalized datasets. We then compare the generalized datasets 
obtained from ARX Anonymization Tool with the generalized dataset obtained from our RU 
Generalization algorithm, with respect to the FADR and Loss measures.    
5.1 ARX Data Anonymization Tool   
ARX is a comprehensive software for anonymizing structured microdata based on user-defined 
privacy criteria, utility measure, and data transformation technique [52]. To be able to compare the 
results from ARX and our developed RU Generalization algorithm, we selected average re-
identification risk measure for the privacy criteria, Loss for the utility measure, and local 
generalization as the transformation technique. Like our RU Generalization algorithm, 
generalization hierarchies for the attributes need to be defined in ARX to perform generalization 
and calculate data utility measures. ARX requires the users to specify the type of attributes, 
whether they are direct-identifier, quasi-identifier, sensitive, or insensitive attributes. This is 
required for benchmark anonymization algorithms, as described in the literature. However, in 
Chapter 3, we explained that classifying attributes is not practical since an adversary with any 
background knowledge and disclosure target may exist, and by classifying attributes we only 
model a specific adversary. We have addressed this issue in FADR measure by considering various 
known and unknown sets of attributes. Since our developed RU Generalization algorithm utilizes 
the FADR measure, different known and unknown sets are taken into consideration for 
anonymization in contrast to the ARX anonymization that only considers one known set of quasi-
identifiers. Figure 17 shows an example screenshot of the ARX software for configuring the 
transformation. On the left, the input data is illustrated. On the right, the user needs to specify 
different parameters. For instance, the age attribute is classified as a quasi-identifier, and the 
transformation is selected to be generalization. The generalization hierarchy for the age attribute 
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is also imported on the right-hand side. Below the generalization hierarchy is where to add the 
privacy criteria and utility measures.    
ARX employs the Flash algorithm to perform anonymization [53]. The Flash algorithm initially 
builds a generalization lattice by combining the generalization hierarchies. For example, consider 
the three attributes of Employment type, Gender, and Age. Example generalization hierarchies for 
such attributes are shown in Figure 18. It shows that Employment type has 2, Gender has 1, and 
Age has 5 levels of generalization. Based on such hierarchies, a generalization lattice is built as 
shown in Figure 19. Each node represents one transformation. For instance, (1,0,2) means the 
employment type is generalized to level 1, gender is not generalized (level 0), and age is 
generalized to level 2. Each level shown in the generalization lattice corresponds to the total level 
of generalizations of the transformations at that level.   
 
 
Figure 17. ARX transformation configuration 
 
All the privacy criteria implemented in ARX have the monotonicity property, meaning that if a 
transformation meets the privacy criteria, all the successor’ transformations in the generalization 
lattice meet the criteria as well. Likewise, if it does not meet the privacy criteria, all the 
predecessor’s transformations do not meet the criteria. Therefore, whenever the Flash algorithm 
checks a transformation, based on whether it meets the criteria or not, it tags the predecessors or 
successors as either the candidate solutions or pruned transformations. For instance, in Figure 19, 
the dark gray nodes are tagged as pruned transformations while the light gray nodes are tagged as 
the candidate solutions. The tagged transformations will no longer be checked by the algorithm, 
which improves the efficiency of the algorithm.            
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Figure 18. Example generalization hierarchies for building the generalization lattice 
 
 
Figure 19. Illustration of the first iteration of Flash algorithm on the generalization lattice [53] 
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The Flash algorithm navigates through all the levels of the generalization lattice, from the lowest 
level to the top. At each iteration, it takes one node of the level, and creates a path of non-tagged 
nodes through a depth-first search towards the top node. Once the path is created, a binary search 
is implemented on the path. The search starts at the node in the middle level of the path and checks 
the privacy criteria. If the transformation meets the criteria, all the successors in the lattice are 
tagged as candidate solutions and the binary search goes into the lower half of the path. If the 
transformation does not meet the criteria, all the predecessors in the lattice are pruned and the 
binary search goes into the upper half of the path. The algorithm stops when all nodes are tagged. 
Among the candidate solutions, the one incurring minimum information loss is selected as the 
optimum solution.    
Figure 19 shows the first iteration of the flash algorithm. It starts from (0,0,0) and creates a path 
to (2,1,5) illustrated with the dashed green flashes. For binary search, the first node to check the 
privacy criteria is (0,0,4). Since it does not meet the criteria, all the predecessors are pruned as 
shown in dark gray. Then, the node at the middle level of the upper half of the path is checked, 
which is (1,0,5). Again, it does not meet the criteria, and all the predecessors are pruned. The next 
node to check is (2,0,5), which meets the criteria, and therefore is tagged as a candidate solution 
along with all its successors (shown in light grey).      
As mentioned earlier, we have selected average re-identification risk as our privacy criteria in 
ARX. This privacy model ensures that the average re-identification risk of records in the dataset, 
after anonymization, is less than a user-defined threshold. This criteria is checked in the following 
steps [52]: 
1. Apply transformation to data. 
2. While risk estimate is greater than the threshold: 
2.1. Suppress all the records in the equivalence class which incurs the highest 
information loss. 
2.2.  Recalculate re-identification risk. 
3. If the number of suppressed records is lower than a user-defined suppression limit, the 
privacy criteria is met and the transformation is a candidate solution. 
The Flash algorithm applies global recoding generalization, which transforms all the values of a 
quasi-identifier to the same level of generalization. However, in ARX, we can enable the local 
recording feature to be added to the Flash algorithm. ARX will perform local recoding by 
recursively executing a global transformation algorithm on records that have been suppressed in 
the previous iteration. With this method, a significant improvement in data quality can be achieved. 
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5.2 RU Generalization Algorithm vs. ARX Average Re-identification Risk Model 
The global transformation algorithm in ARX anonymization tool tends to incur higher information 
loss than our developed RU Generalization algorithm. In ARX, the generalization is applied to all 
the records, at each iteration, whereas our RU Generalization algorithm applies generalization to 
only a group of records with the lowest information loss that contains the highest risk record, at 
each iteration.  
Our RU Generalization algorithm targets the records with the highest disclosure risk, at each 
iteration of generalization, to reduce the maximum disclosure risk by incurring low information 
loss. In ARX, the generalization is applied to all the records to reduce the total disclosure risk, 
without prioritizing the records at high risk of disclosure.  
The average re-identification risk model in ARX only considers identity disclosure risk, whereas 
our RU Generalization algorithm works with FADR measure which is a combined measure of 
identity and attribute disclosure risk. In addition, ARX requires a pre-defined set of quasi-
identifiers and sensitive attributes, which restricts the background knowledge and disclosure target 
of an adversary. FADR measure used in RU Generalization algorithm gives the flexibility in 
modeling adversaries by assigning different publicly known probabilities and sensitivity weights 
to attributes.                
5.2.1 Experiments    
In this section, we evaluate the disclosure risk and information loss of the generalized datasets 
obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm and ARX anonymization tool, and compare our 
algorithm with the benchmark algorithm implemented in ARX.   
Table 27 shows the parameters we used in this experiment, for our algorithm and in ARX. We 
have executed the average re-identification risk privacy model in ARX, with Flash algorithm, on 
our Adult sample dataset, to obtain the local generalized dataset. As described earlier, in ARX, we 
need to define the type of attributes, and for average re-identification risk privacy model, 
specifying quasi-identifiers is required. In our FADR measure and RU Generalization algorithm, 
we do not specify the quasi-identifiers. Instead, we assign publicly known probabilities to 
attributes and build various known sets of attributes, with different probabilities, and consider all 
in FADR measure and RU Generalization algorithm. In order to make the setting of ARX and our 
RU Generalization algorithm similar, we choose the attributes that appear in the longest known 
sets to be quasi-identifiers in ARX. Such attributes are {Age, Work class, Education, Occupation, 
Race, Gender, Country}. 
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Table 27. Parameters of our RU Generalization algorithm and ARX anonymization tool 
Algorithm Parameters 
RU Generalization 
Algorithm 
All parameters shown in Table 18, Except MaxTotalLoss = n 
ARX Anonymization tool 
Dataset: 
Adult sample dataset, 9 
attributes and 30162 records 
(same dataset used in Chapter 
3 experiment) 
Quasi-identifiers: 
{Age, Work class, Education, 
Occupation, Race, Gender, 
Country} 
Privacy Model: 
Average Re-identification 
Risk 
Maximum Average Re-
identification Risk: 
{0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3} 
Information Loss Metric: Loss 
Suppression Limit: 100% 
Local Recoding: Enabled 
 
It is also recommended, in ARX, to set the suppression limit to 100%, in order to balance the 
generalization and suppression to achieve the optimal solution [52].     
As described earlier, the average re-identification risk privacy model in ARX ensures that the 
average re-identification risk of records does not exceed a maximum value predefined by user. In 
our experiments, we set the parameter to the values 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, to obtain different 
generalized datasets. Then, we calculated the FADR values of the obtained datasets, through 
Algorithm 7. For the calculation of likelihood and consequence, we used the same parameters of 
Chapter 3, shown in Table 5. The total FADR of the generalized dataset is then calculated as the 
sum of all the records’ FADR values. We then normalized the total FADR, by dividing the values 
by the maximum total FADR, which is for the original dataset. In addition, we calculated the total 
Loss of the generalized datasets by adding the Loss of all attributes of the generalized records, 
calculated from Eq. (14, based on the attributes’ generalization hierarchies, shown in Chapter 4. 
We considered the maximum information loss to be equal to n, which implies that the highest 
information loss occurs when we have n suppressed values in the generalized dataset. With such 
maximum Loss value, we normalized the total Loss values.  
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Table 28 illustrates the comparison of disclosure risk and information loss between the optimum 
generalized dataset obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm and ARX anonymization tool. 
The superscripts of ARX in the table represent the maximum average re-identification risk 
specified at each trial. The total FADR and total Loss measures in the table are normalized. Total 
FADR is normalized by being divided by the maximum total FADR, which is the total FADR of 
the original dataset. Total Loss is normalized by being divided by a user-defined maximum total 
Loss value. In the experiment, we set it to the size of dataset, which is n.    
 
Table 28. Comparing FADR and Loss of the generalized datasets obtained from ARX and our 
RU Generalization algorithm. 
 
Max 
Record's  
FADR 
Value 
Normalized 
Total 
FADR % 
Normalized 
Total Loss % 
(max total loss = 
n) 
Objective 
Function  
(Total FADR 
% + 
Total Loss %) 
Execution 
Time 
(sec) 
Original Data 69.16 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% ------- 
𝑨𝑹𝑿𝟎.𝟎𝟏 12.81 2.95% 178.65% 181.60% 3.08 
𝑨𝑹𝑿𝟎.𝟏 6.14 4.62% 69.22% 73.84% 2.42 
𝑨𝑹𝑿𝟎.𝟐 25.98 7.43% 38.06% 45.48% 2.21 
𝑨𝑹𝑿𝟎.𝟑 54.57 12.75% 24.39% 37.14% 2.04 
RU 
Generalization  
Algorithm 
5.92 18.34% 13.83% 32.17% 13,425.31 
 
Table 28 indicates that as the maximum average risk of the privacy model in ARX increases, the 
total FADR increases and the total Loss decreases. Since we have defined the maximum 
information loss, it is possible that the normalized total Loss exceeds the 100 percent. That means 
the total information loss exceeds the maximum value the user defined. Comparing the total FADR 
and total Loss of the generalized datasets from ARX and our algorithm, we can see that our 
algorithm produces the highest total disclosure risk and the lowest total information loss. Although 
the total disclosure risk of our algorithm is highest, the maximum of records’ FADR values in our 
obtained generalized dataset is 5.92, which is the lowest maximum record’s FADR value compared 
to the ARX generalized datasets. This indicates the effectiveness of our algorithm in targeting the 
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records at high risk of disclosure and reducing the disclosure risk at the record level. Besides, we 
can see that ARX does not prioritize the high-risk records by comparing the two privacy models 
of 0.01 and 0.1 maximum average risk thresholds. The former outputs higher maximum record’s 
FADR value while incurring lower total FADR.      
To evaluate the generalized datasets based on both disclosure risk and information loss at the same 
time, we considered the objective function defined in Chapter 4, as the summation of normalized 
total FADR and normalized total Loss. Table 28 shows that our algorithm outputs the minimum 
of the objective function, compared to the ARX outputs.  
The execution time of the algorithms are shown in Table 28. ARX anonymization tool is highly 
efficient in time, compared to our algorithm, because of the pruning strategy that is used in global 
recoding algorithm. As described before, the privacy models in ARX have monotonicity property, 
which enables the pruning strategy on the generalization lattice. The privacy model we used in our 
experiments is average re-identification risk model, which only measures the identity disclosure 
by considering the inverse frequency of the known tuples. However, our RU Generalization 
algorithm uses the FADR measure which also considers the attribute disclosure attacks and 
therefore is not monotone in the generalization lattice and cannot employ the pruning strategy. Our 
RU Generalization algorithm is slower because of our greedy approach of reducing the disclosure 
risk of high-risk records by incurring low information loss, at each iteration. The high execution 
time of our algorithm results in a considerable decrease in information loss and significant 
reduction in maximum disclosure risk.     
Figure 20 compares the distribution of records’ FADR values in the original dataset, the 
generalized dataset obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm, and ARX with 0.3 maximum 
average re-identification risk model. It shows that most records in the original dataset have high 
disclosure risk. With ARX, the majority of records converted to low risk records (FADR between 
0 and 0.1). However, a few records (76 records) still have high disclosure risk (FADR between 10 
and 70). With our generalization algorithm, no records with disclosure risk of more than 10 exist, 
and the majority of records are converted to have FADR values between 0.1 and 0.2. 
Figure 21 illustrates the percentage of original values in each attribute that are remained intact 
after generalization, with both ARX and our RU Generalization algorithm. The Gender attribute 
has not been generalized with either ARX or our RU Generalization algorithm. The attributes that 
have been generalized are Age, Work class, Education, Occupation, Race, and Country. These are 
the attributes that have been classified as quasi-identifiers in ARX, and appeared in the known sets 
of our RU Generalization algorithm. Figure 21 shows that the generalized dataset obtained from 
our RU Generalization algorithm better preserves the original values of Age, Education, 
Occupation, and Country attributes, compared to the generalized datasets obtained from ARX 
trials. Race attribute has not been generalized with ARX but our RU Generalization algorithm 
generalizes 0.54% of the Race values. Work class attribute has the highest number of non-
generalized values in ARX trial of 0.1 maximum average record’s risk parameter.  
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Figure 20. Distribution of records' FADR values on original dataset and generalized datasets obtained 
from our algorithm and ARX 
Figure 21 indicates the percentage of attribute values that are not generalized. To see the details 
on the generalized values, Table 30-35 show the distribution of attribute values in the generalized 
datasets from ARX and our RU Generalization algorithm. Since our algorithm and the ARX 
implementation are both using local recoding generalization, we can see that the attributes in the 
generalized datasets have values from multiple levels of generalizations.   
Table 30 shows how the Age attribute values are generalized. ARX follows a generalization 
hierarchy for Age attribute, shown in Table 29. However, our RU Generalization algorithm does 
not use generalization hierarchy trees for the numeric attributes.  Our RU Generalization algorithm 
generalizes the age value to the range of values of the group that is going to be generalized. 
Therefore, as Table 30 shows, our algorithm creates more categories of age generalized values 
compared to ARX that has specific levels of generalizations.   
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Figure 21. Percentage of original values in each attribute that are preserved in the generalized 
datasets obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm and from the ARX Anonymization Tool 
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Table 29. Generalization hierarchy tree for Age attribute used in ARX 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
[1, 5] [1, 10] [1, 20] * 
[6, 10] [1, 10] [1, 20] * 
[11, 15] [11, 20] [1, 20] * 
[16, 20] [11, 20] [1, 20] * 
[21, 25] [21, 30] [21, 40] * 
[26, 30] [21, 30] [21, 40] * 
[31, 35] [31, 40] [21, 40] * 
[36, 40] [31, 40] [21, 40] * 
[41, 45] [41, 50] [41, 60] * 
[46, 50] [41, 50] [41, 60] * 
[51, 55] [51, 60] [41, 60] * 
[56, 60] [51, 60] [41, 60] * 
[61, 65] [61, 70] [61, 80] * 
[66, 70] [61, 70] [61, 80] * 
[71, 75] [71, 80] [61, 80] * 
[76, 80] [71, 80] [61, 80] * 
[81, 85] [81, 90] [81, 100] * 
[86, 90] [81, 90] [81, 100] * 
[91, 95] [91, 100] [81, 100] * 
[96, 100] [91, 100] [81, 100] * 
 
Table 31 shows that 4.94% of the Work class attribute values, in the generalized dataset obtained 
from our RU Generalization algorithm, are generalized to Government, Non-Government, 
Unemployed categories while 1.38% of the values are suppressed. 
Table 32 shows that about 1% of the Education attribute values, in the generalized dataset obtained 
from our RU Generalization algorithm, are generalized to Primary School, High School, 
Undergraduate, Graduate, Professional Education categories, and less than one percent are either 
generalized to Primary Education, Secondary Education, Higher Education categories or have 
been suppressed. 
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Table 30. Generalized values for Age attribute in the obtained generalized datasets 
Generalized Values 
RU Generalization Algorithm 
ARX 
0.3 
ARX 
0.2 
ARX 
0.1 
[17, 20], [20, 32], [26, 36], [32, 75], [38, 47], [48, 68] 
[17, 22], [20, 34], [26, 47], [33, 37], [38, 51], [48, 90] 
[17, 23], [20, 43], [27, 42], [33, 40], [38, 52], [49, 66] 
[17, 26], [20, 55], [27, 43], [33, 51], [38, 59], [49, 90] 
[17, 29], [21, 28], [27, 47], [33, 52], [38, 63], [50, 61] 
[17, 31], [21, 31], [27, 53], [33, 53], [40, 49], [50, 68] 
[17, 33], [21, 34], [27, 77], [33, 54], [40, 56], [51, 65] 
[17, 34], [21, 42], [28, 33], [33, 59], [40, 58], [52, 70] 
[17, 35], [21, 46], [28, 43], [33, 61], [40, 62], [53, 90] 
[17, 36], [22, 44], [28, 47], [33, 66], [41, 68], [55, 64] 
[17, 47], [22, 49], [28, 49], [33, 90], [43, 60], [55, 66] 
[17, 71], [23, 29], [28, 56], [34, 55], [44, 75], [55, 69] 
[17, 75], [23, 37], [29, 30], [34, 57], [45, 59], [55, 71] 
[17, 77], [23, 40], [29, 31], [35, 71], [45, 69], [56, 66] 
[17, 80], [23, 41], [29, 43], [36, 47], [46, 57], [57, 71] 
[18, 29], [23, 43], [29, 45], [36, 50], [46, 60], [61, 90] 
[18, 31], [23, 49], [30, 40], [36, 52], [46, 66], [62, 90] 
[18, 32], [23, 58], [31, 34], [36, 55], [47, 59], [65, 68] 
[18, 35], [24, 27], [31, 77], [36, 57], [47, 61], [65, 90] 
[19, 26], [24, 62], [32, 33], [37, 41], [47, 70], [67, 90] 
[19, 29], [25, 40], [32, 43], [38, 44], [48, 62], [70, 90] 
[19, 33], [25, 41], [32, 48], [38, 45], [48, 65], [71, 90] 
[72, 90] 
 
[1, 20] 
[21, 40] 
[41, 60] 
[61, 80] 
[81, 100] 
* 
[1, 20] 
[11, 20] 
[21, 30] 
[21, 40] 
[31, 40] 
[41, 50] 
[41, 60] 
[51, 60] 
[61, 70] 
[61, 80] 
[71, 80] 
[81,100] 
* 
[1, 20] 
[16, 20] 
[21, 25] 
[21, 40] 
[26, 30] 
[31, 35] 
[36, 40] 
[41, 45] 
[41, 60] 
[46, 50] 
[51, 55] 
[56, 60] 
[61, 65] 
[61, 80] 
[66, 70] 
[81,100] 
 
Table 33 shows that in the generalized dataset obtained from our RU Generalization algorithm, 
0.19% of the Occupation attribute values are generalized to Technical, Non-Technical, Other 
categories while no values are suppressed.  
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Table 31. Relative frequency of Work class attribute values in different generalization levels 
Generalization Levels of Attribute  
“Work Class” 
Level 0 
{original values} 
Level 1 
{Government, 
Non-Government, 
Unemployed} 
Level 2 
{*} 
RU Generalization Algorithm 93.65% 4.94% 1.38% 
0.3 max average re-identification risk 91.07% 8.93% 0.00% 
0.2 max average re-identification risk 88.05% 11.95% 0.00% 
0.1 max average re-identification risk 98.73% 0.00% 1.27% 
 
Table 32. Relative frequency of Education attribute values in different generalization levels 
Generalization Levels 
of Attribute 
“Education” 
Level 0 
{original 
values} 
Level 1 
{Primary School, 
High School, 
Undergraduate, 
Graduate, 
Professional 
Education} 
Level 2 
{Primary 
Education, 
Secondary 
Education, Higher 
Education} 
 
Level 3 
{*} 
RU Generalization 
Algorithm 
98.89% 1.01% 0.02% 0.08% 
0.3 max average 
re-identification risk 
91.07% 0.00% 8.93% 0.00% 
0.2 max average 
re-identification risk 
73.54% 25.11% 0.00% 1.35% 
0.1 max average 
re-identification risk 
76.43% 12.17% 10.12% 1.27% 
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Table 33. Relative frequency of Occupation attribute values in different generalization levels 
Generalization Levels 
of Attribute “Occupation” 
Level 0 
{original 
values} 
Level 1 
{Technical, 
Non-Technical,  
Other} 
Level 2 
{*} 
 
RU Generalization Algorithm 99.81% 0.19% 0.00% 
0.3 max average re-identification 
risk 
91.07% 8.93% 0.00% 
0.2 max average re-identification 
risk 
88.05% 10.60% 1.35% 
0.1 max average re-identification 
risk 
76.43% 22.30% 1.27% 
Table 34. Relative frequency of Race attribute values in different generalization levels 
Generalization Levels of Attribute “Race” 
Level 0 
{original values} 
Level 1 
{*} 
 
RU Generalization Algorithm 99.46% 0.54% 
0.3 max average re-identification risk 100.00% 0.00% 
0.2 max average re-identification risk 100.00% 0.00% 
0.1 max average re-identification risk 100.00% 0.00% 
 
Table 34 shows that our RU Generalization algorithm suppressed 0.54% of the Race attribute 
values. Table 35 shows that in the generalized dataset obtained from our RU Generalization 
algorithm, 0.47% of the Country attribute values are generalized to Africa, Asia, Europe, North 
America, South America categories, and 5.56% of values are suppressed.   
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Table 35. Relative frequency of Country attribute values in different generalization levels 
Generalization Levels of Attribute 
“Country” 
Level 0 
{original values} 
Level 1 
{Africa, Asia, 
Europe, 
North America, 
South America} 
Level 2 
{*} 
 
RU Generalization Algorithm 93.97% 0.47% 5.56% 
0.3 max average re-identification 
risk 
91.07% 8.93% 0.00% 
0.2 max average re-identification 
risk 
88.05% 11.95% 0.00% 
0.1 max average re-identification 
risk 
88.61% 10.12% 1.27% 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this study, we developed a novel privacy disclosure risk measure, at the records level, named 
FADR, as a combined measure of identity and attribute disclosure measure. FADR considers all 
possible external knowledge and disclosure target and provides the flexibility in modeling different 
adversaries. A pruning algorithm is developed to handle the calculation efficiency of FADR 
measure. A set of experiments have been conducted to show the effectiveness of the pruning 
algorithm on the efficiency of FADR calculation and the robustness of FADR measure to the small 
changes on the input parameters.      
In addition, we developed RU Generalization algorithm to obtain an optimized generalized dataset. 
Unlike the anonymization algorithms in the literature that satisfy a pre-defined privacy level by 
incurring the minimum information loss, our RU Generalization algorithm aims at minimizing the 
combination of both disclosure risk and information loss. Our algorithm is a greedy heuristic 
algorithm that targets the records at high disclosure risk and applies generalization on such records 
with the lowest information loss. We used our developed FADR measure as the disclosure risk 
metric in our RU Generalization algorithm since FADR enables our generalization algorithm to 
consider different adversaries and address both identity and attribute disclosure attacks.    
We compared our RU Generalization algorithm with the Flash benchmark generalization 
algorithm that is implemented in ARX anonymization tool. Through a set of experiments, we have 
shown that our RU Generalization algorithm outperforms the Flash algorithm with respect to 
significant reduction in the maximum record’s disclosure risk and total information loss. Flash 
algorithm has shown better efficiency than our algorithm, due to the pruning strategy that is 
applicable for in ARX privacy models. However, the privacy model of disclosure risk in ARX 
only considers the identity disclosure, whereas our FADR measure addresses the attribute 
disclosure attack as well. 
Our developed FADR measure can be extended to include different privacy requirements. One 
future work direction of this study is to address homogeneity and similarity attacks in FADR 
measure. The consequence term in FADR can add penalties to records being threatened by such 
attacks. In addition, our RU Generalization algorithm requires improvements in efficiency. We 
can integrate the generalization lattice and pruning strategy of the Flash algorithm into our RU 
Generalization algorithm to reduce the computation complexity of our algorithm.    
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